Char 2C
The Char 2C, also known as the FCM 2C, was a French post WWI heavy tank landship, later considered a super-heavy tank. It was developed during World War I but not deployed until after the war. It was, in total volume or physical dimensions, the largest operational tank ever made.
Ten tanks were built in 1921. Although remaining operational, their value at the start of World War II was largely propagandistic. After Germany broke through French defences in June 1940, they were sent away from the front to preserve them. They were unable to reach safety and deliberately destroyed to prevent capture.
Development
The ''char d'assaut de grand modèle''
The origins of the Char 2C have always been shrouded in a certain mystery. In the summer of 1916, likely in July, General Léon Augustin Jean Marie Mourret, the Subsecretary of Artillery, verbally granted Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée, a shipyard in the south of France near Toulon, the contract for the development of a heavy tank, a char d'assaut de grand modèle. At the time, French industry was very active in lobbying for defence orders, using their connections with high-placed officials and officers to obtain commissions; development contracts could be very profitable even when not resulting in actual production, as they were fully paid for by the state. The French Army had no stated requirement for a heavy tank, and there was no official policy to procure one. Hence, the decision seemed to have been taken solely on his personal authority. The reason he later gave was that the British tanks then in development by a naval committee seemed to be better devised as regarded lay-out, ventilation and fire protection, so a shipyard might improve on existing French designs.Exact specifications, if they ever existed, have been lost. FCM then largely neglected the project, apart from reaping the financial benefits. At that time, all tank projects were highly secret, and thereby shielded from public scrutiny.
On 15 September 1916, the British introduced their Mark I tank at the Battle of the Somme, The public mood in Britain had been growing ever darker as the overall failure of the Somme Offensive became known, tanks offered a new hope of final victory. The French public wanted to know about their own national tank projects and French politicians, up til then not having been greatly involved in them and leaving the matter to the military, were also interested. This sudden attention greatly alarmed Mourret, who promptly investigated the progress that had been made at FCM and was shocked to find there was none. On 30 September, he personally took control of the project. On 12 October, knowing that the Renault company had some months earlier made several proposals to build a heavy tracked mortar which had been rejected, he begged Louis Renault to assist FCM in the development of a suitable heavy vehicle; this request Renault obliged. Even before knowing what the exact nature of the project would be, on 20 October Mourret ordered one prototype to be built by FCM.
This development coincided with a political demand by Minister of Armaments Albert Thomas to produce a tank superior to the British types. On 7 October, he had asked the British prime minister David Lloyd George to deliver some Mark Is to France but had received no answer. Concluding, correctly, that no such deliveries would materialise, on 23 January 1917 he ordered that French tanks should be developed that were faster, and more powerfully armed and armoured than any British vehicle. He specified a weight of forty tonnes, immunity against light artillery rounds and a trench-crossing capability of 3.5 metres.
Meanwhile, Renault had consulted his own team, led by Rodolphe Ernst-Metzmaier, which since May 1916 had been in the process of designing the revolutionary Renault FT light tank. This work had not, however, stopped them from considering other tank types. Renault, always expecting his employees to provide new ideas instantly, had by this attitude encouraged the team to take a proactive stance – setting a pattern that would last until 1940 – and to have various kinds of contingency studies ready for the occasion, including a feasibility study for a heavy tank. This fortunate circumstance allowed a full-size wooden mockup to be constructed in a remarkably quick time. It was visited by the Undersecretary of State for Inventions for National Defense Jules-Louis Breton on 13 January 1917, who was much impressed and developed a keen interest in the project. The design was presented to the Consultative Committee of the Assault Artillery on 16 and 17 January 1917, after the basic concept had been approved on 30 December. This proposed tank was the most advanced design of its time; it was received very favourably, also because of the enthusiastic report by Breton, and a consensus began to form that the project was most promising and a potential "war-winner". It featured a 105 mm gun in a turret and had a proposed weight of 38 tons, as well as 35 mm armour. The committee decided to have two prototypes developed, one with an electrical transmission, the other with a hydraulic transmission. In this period, both the French and British military had become aware of severe mobility and steering problems with heavy tracked vehicles; the French designs paralleled extensive British experiments with all kinds of improved tank transmissions to solve them.
Resistance to the project
In January 1917, the Ministry of Armament proposed building three weight classes of tanks: light, medium, and heavy tanks, the latter class corresponding to the new project. However, brigadier Jean Baptiste Eugène Estienne, commander of the new tank force, the Assault Artillery, was closely cooperating with Renault in the development of the Renault FT, and by this was well informed of the other tank project. Estienne feared that production of heavy tanks would use all available production facilities, making procurement of the - much more practical - Renault FT light tank impossible. He was not averse to the production of heavy tanks but only in a limited number and provided it did not impede the manufacture of light tanks. In November Mourret argued that all available resources should be concentrated into heavy tank production and development of the Renault FT halted. Alarmed, Estienne wrote to the Commander-in-Chief, General Joseph Joffre, on 27 November 1916 defending the light tank concept. He admitted that "colossal landships" might in certain circumstances have their uses, but claimed that while it was as yet unproven that a workable heavy type could be developed, let alone produced in sufficient numbers by French industry, it would be folly not to give priority to light tanks that could be constructed without delay. He insisted that Joffre use all his influence to bring about the cancellation of the heavy tank project.Joffre answered that Estienne was no doubt correct in his tactical and organisational analysis, but that political backing of the heavy tank was simply too strong. The Minister of Armament, Albert Thomas, had committed himself openly to Mourret's cause and did not dare to retract support now. Joffre advised Estienne that he would make sure that the Renault FT would not be cancelled, and since heavy tank development would take such a long time it would not - for the immediate future - get in the way of light tank production. There would surely be no harm in allowing some prototypes to be built.
The Consultative Committee of the Assault Artillery had been created on 13 December 1916 and met for the first time on 17 December. During this first session it was reported that Renault and FCM were cooperating on a heavy tank project of thirty tonnes. Estienne on this occasion stressed that production should be "orientated towards small types and very large types". During the next meeting on 30 December, Estienne was surprised to discover that for no clear reasons a 105 mm gun was planned; he himself preferred a 75 mm gun. Estienne was absent on the crucial meeting of 17 January, but by letter informed the committee that he found the project satisfactory and agreed with the quick construction of two prototypes; he stated his preference for a 75 mm over a 105 mm gun.
In December Joffre was replaced as supreme commander by Robert Nivelle. In late January Nivelle learned of the heavy tank project from Estienne. He was much more alarmed than Joffre had been. On 29 January he wrote a letter to Thomas, making clear that under no circumstances could the project be allowed to impede production of the Schneider CA. Thomas answered on 5 February that there was no danger of this; anyway he had just happened to affirm on 1 February the policy of General Mourret, who had already ordered the simultaneous development of three prototypes: the lightened 30-tonne "A" version, 6.92 metres long, with a 75 mm gun, to fulfil the original order of 20 October; the 45-tonne "B" version with a longer hull, armed with a 75 mm gun and two machine guns, and the 62-ton "C" version 9.31 meters long with a 75 mm gun. Nivelle's misgivings were reinforced by inquiries from a parliamentary financial commission led by Pierre Renaudel. A plan by Breton to immediately order fifty vehicles more or less identical to the mock-up was therefore rejected. The 1 February order of two additional prototypes was confirmed by the CCAS on 7 February. Eventually the "FCM 1A" would be developed with a 105 mm gun and the "FCM 1B" would use a petrol-mechanical transmission.
At first, progress with the FCM 1A prototype was satisfactory. Moritz was assured by Renault in January 1917 that the desired engines were reliable and would pose no danger to the project. Moritz predicted that the first prototype would be ready by 1 May 1917. On 10 April 1917 he still assumed that the first trials could have begun within five weeks. On 16 April the Nivelle offensive began, although it had tactical successes it failed to deal a strategic defeat on German forces and the first use of French tanks led to heavy losses ; in reaction Thomas ordered all tank production and projects to be ended. This led to an emergency alliance between Estienne and Mourret to bring about a reversal of this decision. While Thomas was visiting Russia, Mourret surreptitiously ordered a restart of the tank projects. On his return an enraged Thomas caused Mourret to be fired, removing Estienne's greatest rival. Meanwhile, there were unexplained delays in the delivery of the engines and the gearbox by Renault. On 5 June, FCM could only take note that the promised pieces had not arrived yet. On 24 June the ministry of armament complained about the situation. On 13 August Breton was told by Renault personally that it would take at least another three weeks. A possible explanation of the delays might be a decision by Renault to give priority to other projects. During a meeting of the CCAS on 18 October, Moritz at last announced that trials could begin on 20 November. In that meeting Estienne was critical of heavy tanks: "the infantry has as much need of large tanks, as it needs 400 mm cannon; it has need of small tanks, as much as it needs 37 mm and machine-guns".