Brazilian Submarine Force
The Submarine Force of the Brazilian Navy is the component of the Fleet that organizes these assets and their naval bases, auxiliary vessels, training schools, and divers. Its operational components comprise four submarines, one rescue ship, one aviso, and a special operations unit, the Combat Divers Group. Its main anchorage and command headquarters is Madeira Island, in Itaguaí, with additional facilities on Mocanguê Grande Island, in Niterói–both in the state of Rio de Janeiro.
Brazil has operated submarines since 1914, beginning with the Foca class. Historically, there has been an average of four to five submarines in service, with a peak of ten in 1977–1978. They were built abroad until the 1980s, when Brazilian industry became the first in the Southern Hemisphere to assemble submarines. The technological source shifted from Italy to the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and currently France. From the Second World War to the early Cold War, during the Italian and American phases, priority was given to training surface forces in anti-submarine warfare.
From the 1970s onward, Navy strategists rethought submarines as elements of a balanced blue-water fleet and/or as instruments for sea denial in a defensive campaign off the coast. The 2008 National Defense Strategy confirmed their priority on the Navy's agenda, and since then the Submarine Development Program has aimed to build a mixed fleet of conventionally armed submarines with conventional propulsion and nuclear propulsion in Brazil. The conventional submarines–the only type currently in service–are more suitable for positional warfare. The future Brazilian nuclear-powered submarine will be a complementary platform with greater autonomy and mobility, officially intended for deterrence and the patrol of jurisdictional waters.
Brazilian submariners are volunteers trained at the Admiral Áttila Monteiro Aché Training and Instruction Center. The career of a submarine crew member is prestigious, highly specialized, and psychologically demanding. The working environment is isolated, confined, artificial, and has its own culture. Risks are constant. The largest accident in ForSub's history was the sinking of Tonelero at the pier in 2000, but there were no fatalities or injuries.
Origins
In the 1890s, Lieutenant Felinto Perry campaigned in the press for the acquisition of submersibles. Other naval officers, such as Luís de Mello Marques, Luís Jacinto Gomes, and Emílio Júlio Hess, presented designs for such vessels, but none received funding for construction. Only after the purchase of Italian Foca-class submarines did the Brazilian Navy activate the "Submersible Flotilla" on 17 July 1914, under the command of Officer Perry–by then a frigate captain. This organization was the forerunner of today's Submarine Force. In 1928, it changed its designation to Submarine Flotilla; it was disbanded in 1933, reestablished in 1937, and renamed under its current designation in 1963. Its headquarters were located on Mocanguê Grande Island, in Niterói, from its creation until 2021, when it was transferred to its current base in Itaguaí.Doctrine and missions
In the early years of the 20th century, the role to be assigned to submersibles was unclear and tended to be defensive. The first Brazilian submersibles lacked the range, size, and armament to contribute much beyond port defense. The very terminology–submersible rather than submarine–evokes the technological difference from modern vessels, although there is no consensus on the moment or characteristics that distinguish one from the other, and not every language makes this distinction.In 21st-century naval doctrine, the submarine is an offensive weapon, albeit one embedded within a national defensive strategy. It is "the only warship capable of operating independently, for long periods, in seas dominated by the enemy". Less dependent on logistical support and weather conditions than surface ships, it can operate alone and from the outset of hostilities. Its stealth and three-dimensional mobility allow it to strike with the advantage of surprise and inflict damage disproportionate to its own cost, although it can withstand little damage if hit. Its usual weapons–missiles and torpedoes–do not allow the destructive power to be finely calibrated to circumstances, and its very presence in a crisis area by itself exacerbates tensions. From the standpoint of international law, submarines face difficulties in rescuing shipwreck survivors and in target identification.
Anti-submarine warfare
In both World Wars, submarines found a niche in commerce raiding, sinking merchant ships to choke the enemy's maritime lines of communication. Attacks by German U-boats on the Brazilian merchant marine were the immediate causes of Brazil's entry into both World Wars. In the following decades, the Brazilian Navy worked with the hypothesis of a Third World War involving Soviet submarine attacks against maritime traffic. From its participation in the Second World War through the 1970s, Brazil adhered to the logic of collective defense of the Western Hemisphere, within the diplomatic framework of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. Latin American navies were to focus on anti-submarine warfare in a complementary role to the hemispheric leader, the United States Navy.This relegated Brazil's submarines to the task of training surface forces in convoy escort and the identification of enemy submarines. Warfare at sea thus came to encompass three dimensions, with priority given to surface forces and missions of maritime area control.
Even so, there had already been a technical capacity for offensive actions since the incorporation of SE Humaytá in 1929; this submarine had deterrent potential, being able to blockade an enemy port through minelaying or through its mere presence in the vicinity. At least against an adversary with inferior naval power, Brazilian submarines would be employed for attack. Brazilian doctrine still recognizes possibilities in the anti-submarine domain: against opposing submarines, the Submarine Force could attack bases and control centers or be positioned in their patrol zones and along the approaches to their potential targets.
Anti-submarine warfare lost priority from the 1970s onward, as the Brazilian Navy sought greater autonomy from its U.S. counterpart. The dream of the new generation of officers was a blue-water navy, centered on aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines, with full capabilities to project power and deny the enemy the use of the sea. They could point to the Falklands War: when the British Royal Navy, also focused on anti-submarine warfare, was forced to deal with a scenario unforeseen by its strategists, nuclear submarines proved to be its great advantage against the Argentine Navy. The sinking of ARA General Belgrano by the submarine HMS Conqueror denied the sea to the Argentines, who withdrew their surface fleet to port and left their garrison on the Falkland Islands isolated. The only Argentine warship to remain in action was the submarine ARA San Luis, which nevertheless required considerable British effort to protect the task force.
Sea denial
The traditional employment of submarines is in sea denial against the enemy, and training in this regard took place even when anti-submarine function predominated. Sea denial is one of the basic tasks of naval power in Brazilian doctrine, a list that also includes maritime area control, power projection ashore, and deterrence. The fear of a hidden submarine is a classic sea-denial option: a much larger number of defensive forces is required to protect potential targets from a small number of submarines, producing an effect disproportionate to their numbers. The mere possibility can contribute to deterrence. Under certain circumstances, submarines may be used in MAC, or even in PPA, protecting landing ships or infiltrating special operations forces. Their secondary missions also include reconnaissance and intelligence gathering.The official position in 1997 assigned equal value to SD and MAC tasks. At the turn of the 21st century, submarines were few and there was no clearly defined strategic direction. By inertia, MAC enjoyed some predominance. Some naval leaders already advocated the preponderance of SD, but the shift in mindset would have to be gradual.
The 2008 National Defense Strategy established a hierarchy of tasks: "in the way of conceiving the relationship among the strategic tasks of sea denial, maritime area control, and power projection, the Brazilian Navy will be guided by unequal and joint development". "The priority is to ensure the means to deny the use of the sea to any concentration of enemy forces that approaches Brazil by maritime routes. Denial of the use of the sea to the enemy is what organizes, before any other strategic objectives are met, Brazil's maritime defense strategy. This priority has implications for the reconfiguration of naval forces". "To ensure the objective of sea denial, Brazil will rely on a submarine naval force of significant scale". In the face of a superior enemy or in the early stages of a conflict, submarines, satellites, and aircraft would be the first to enter action, while surface assets would serve as a tactical or strategic reserve.
Subsequent editions of the END reiterated the intention to build a substantial submarine force. The 2012 END acknowledged two strategic options: one focused on defending the coastline and jurisdictional waters against a more dangerous adversary, prioritizing submarines, and another centered on MAC and PPA, with a balanced naval force.
Nuclear propulsion
In the sea-denial task, the submarines historically and currently available would be best employed patrolling focal areas, with designated war or exclusion zones to keep civilian navigation away, supported by reconnaissance assets, defensive minefields, naval installations, and land-based aviation. Their limitation lies in conventional, or diesel-electric, propulsion.The speed, endurance, and stealth of conventional submarines are lower. They must periodically rise to a certain depth–
The limitations of the conventional submarine can be mitigated by air-independent propulsion technology, which has become increasingly common among 21st-century navies. AIP is not used throughout the entire voyage, but only to supplement periods of higher energy demand. The Brazilian Navy rejected this option in favor of a long-standing objective: nuclear propulsion. Since 1979 it has pursued a nuclear program aimed at the future construction of a reactor. Brazilian 21st-century doctrine advocates a mixed submarine force, nuclear and conventional. Nuclear submarines would operate in large maritime areas, while conventional submarines would operate closer to the coast. The advantages of the nuclear submarine in blue waters diminish in the brown waters of the littoral, where the conventional submarine mitigates its weaknesses.
The reactor of a nuclear submarine generates more energy and does not depend on oxygen. Beyond the positional strategy typical of a conventional submarine, it can be employed in a strategy of movement, as it does not need to snorkel and can sustain high speeds for long periods. In this way, it can accompany surface forces on the high seas and carry out successive attacks and evasions, with greater chances of survival. Compared to the conventional submarine, it is larger, has greater minimum and average operating depths, and is more expensive to build. In return, it can patrol the same area as a larger number of conventional submarines, as it spends less time on maintenance transits and inactive periods.
In the English-language nomenclature, conventional submarines are designated SSK, and the nuclear-powered submarines envisioned by Brazil are designated SSN. To emphasize that the submarine will not carry nuclear weapons, the Brazilian Navy refers to its project as a "nuclear-powered conventional submarine", which can be confusing abroad, where "conventional submarine" is synonymous with a diesel-electric–powered submarine. There are submarines with both nuclear propulsion and nuclear armament–the ballistic missile submarines–designated SSBN. Admiral Mauro César Rodrigues Pereira, Minister of the Navy from 1995 to 1999, denied that a Brazilian SSBN was ever contemplated.