Bergier commission
The Bergier commission in Bern was formed by the Swiss government on 12 December 1996 in the wake of the then ongoing World Jewish Congress lawsuit against Swiss banks accused of withholding valuables belonging to Holocaust victims. It is also known as the ICE or UEK.
Founded in a decade when Switzerland had come under recurring criticism for its behaviour during World War II, particularly with respect to its relations with the Nazi government in Germany, the commission was established by the Swiss Parliament and headed by Jean-François Bergier, an economic historian. Made up of Polish, American, Israeli and Swiss historians, the commission's mandate was to investigate the volume and fate of assets moved to Switzerland before, during, and immediately after the Second World War. The investigation was to be made from a historical and legal point of view, with a particular emphasis on the links between the Nazi regime and Swiss banks. The mandate covers almost every type of asset, including gold, currency and cultural assets. The content of the research program was broadened by the government to include economic relations, arms production, "Aryanisation measures", the monetary system, and refugee policy.
Approach
The commission did not set out to write a general history of Switzerland during the Nazi era; rather, it took as its task "to shed light upon certain controversial or insufficiently analyzed aspects of this history, aspects in which it appeared that Switzerland, that is to say its political authorities and economic decision-makers, had perhaps been derelict in assuming their responsibilities."The commission was given unprecedented powers and resources by the Swiss Parliament:
- it was to have unimpeded access to the archives held by Swiss private companies including banks, insurance companies, and enterprises;
- the companies were prohibited from destroying any files relating to the period being examined by the commission;
- the initial budget of 5 million Swiss francs was increased to a total of 22 million francs.
Focus
- that of the Swiss government and its cantons' policy with respect to the refugees.
- that which regards the concessions which the Federal state and a part of the private economy made to the Axis powers.
- that which concerns the issue of restitution of assets once the war had ended.
Final report
Refugee policy
Since the 19th century, Switzerland had a positive humanitarian image based upon the tradition of granting asylum, providing good offices, humanitarian aid, particularly through the work of the Geneva-based International Committee of the Red Cross. However, after the First World War, Switzerland was not immune to xenophobic and antisemitic sentiments that were spreading through Europe. As in other Western countries in the 1930s, Switzerland, increasingly applied restrictions on the admission of foreigners in the name of national security.Switzerland, apparently on its own initiative began to openly apply racist selection criteria according to the Nazi definition. Initial reports produced by the Bergier Commission received news coverage as they suggested that, in 1938, even before the war broke out, the Swiss Government requested the Nazi authorities to stamp all passports of German Jews with a "J" as the Swiss did not recognize the right to asylum of those fleeing racial persecution. The final report did not deem the "J stamp" a Swiss 'idea' but rather stated that the Swiss executive branch, the Federal Council, was responsible for consenting to an agreement with Germany that established its creation :
"It was the Federal Council which decided to close the borders on 18 August 1938, which signed the agreement with Germany concerning the «J»-stamp in Jewish passports on 29 September 1938 and which decided on the subsequent introduction of compulsory visas for German «non-Aryans» on 4 October 1938."
The change in description came as a consequence of a March 2001 retraction regarding the responsibility for the J Stamp and police chief Heinrich Rothmund's role by the Beobachter, the Swiss magazine that had originally revealed the existence of the J-Stamp in the 1950s.
With the increasing persecution of Jews by the Nazi regime, Swiss restrictions were set apart from other restrictive policies of the Allies due to its geographical location: it was the easiest country on the continent for refugees to reach. Thousands of refugees were sent back even though authorities knew that they were likely sending them to their deaths.
The ICE concluded:
Switzerland, and in particular its political leaders, failed when it came to generously offering protection to persecuted Jews. This is all the more serious in view of the fact that the authorities, who were quite aware of the possible consequences of their decision, not only closed the borders in August 1942, but continued to apply this restrictive policy for over a year. By adopting numerous measures making it more difficult for refugees to reach safety, and by handing over the refugees caught directly to their persecutors, the Swiss authorities were instrumental in helping the Nazi regime to attain its goals.
Refugee figures are hard to come by. However the commission concluded that during the Second World War Switzerland offered refuge from Nazi persecution to some 60,000 refugees for varying periods of time, a little under 50% of whom were Jewish.
The commission carefully explained the difficulty of estimating the number of refugees, most of whom were probably Jewish, turned away. In a preliminary report for the commission, an estimate of 24,000 "documented rejections" was published. However, in the final report, perhaps having taken into account criticism of the earlier figures, the commission was more cautious, indicating that it must be assumed that "Switzerland turned back or deported over 20,000 refugees during the Second World War." Specifically, they reported that during the period from 1 January 1942, after the borders were closed, to 31 December 1942, 3,507 refugees were turned back.
In August 2001 when the commission issued a final conclusion, with respect to refugee policy, stating
that, "measured against its previous stand in terms of humanitarian aid and asylum where its refugee policy was concerned, neutral Switzerland not only failed to live up to its own standards, but also violated fundamental humanitarian principles."
Economic relations
The commission defined its focus: "The question which arises is not whether Switzerland should or could have maintained its business contacts and foreign trade with the warring powers in the first place, but rather how far these activities went: in other words, where the line should be drawn between unavoidable concessions and intentional collaboration."Foreign trade relations
Switzerland, which relied heavily on foreign trade, experienced an increasingly difficult position during the protectionist 1930's. This worsened when war broke out in 1939. "Maintaining trade and business traffic was an 'essential precondition for conducting the wartime economy...'"Swiss exports were a necessary condition for obtaining imports of necessary food and raw materials required for the population. Maintaining trade with the warring powers was thus required to meet "the domestic political objectives, in particular to supply the population with food and purchasing power." To achieve this goal, the Federal government set up structure in order to control foreign trade.
This was done in part through continual negotiations with the warring parties, particularly with Nazi Germany. On the whole, this policy was successful: "Switzerland's efforts to achieve close economic co-operation with Germany brought it dual advantages. Swiss businesses emerged from the war years both technologically and financially stronger. The state was able to realise the central objectives of its defence and economic policies."
Switzerland intended to continue economic relations with all countries, but because of the war, there was a large shift to relations with the Axis powers resulting in large increases in exports to the Axis powers and large reductions in trade with England and France. Germany during the period July 1940 and July 1944 became the largest importer of Swiss goods. Thus domestic production was directly linked on the success of trade negotiations, particularly with the German government.
The actual supplies of armament related goods exported to Germany was quite small: just 1% of German armament end products. Some specialized items, i.e. time fuses accounted for a little more than 10%.
Far more important was the role played by Switzerland's open capital market—sale of gold and securities—and as the Franc was the only convertible currency available to the Axis powers, it played a vital role in paying for certain strategic imports such as tungsten and oil.
In order to finance its imports from Switzerland, the German government demanded "clearing loans" which took the form of state guarantees to exporters. "The Swiss clearing loans made it possible for the German and Italian armies to fund their large-scale armaments purchases in Switzerland."
Whether the contribution of Swiss exports to German rearmament during the war is considered to have been more or less significant does not affect the principal findings of our investigation. Of greater importance was the role played by Switzerland in the years leading up to 1933, when – together with other European countries – it accommodated the covert rearmament of Germany. Without this opportunity, Germany would not have been able to start a pan-European war in so short a time.