Battle of Plataea

The Battle of Plataea was the final land battle during the second Persian invasion of Greece. It took place in 479BC near the city of Plataea in Boeotia, and was fought between an alliance of the Greek city-states, and the Achaemenid Empire of Xerxes I.
At the preceding Battle of Salamis, the allied Greek navy had won an unlikely but decisive victory, preventing the conquest of the Peloponnesus region. Xerxes then retreated with much of his army, leaving his general Mardonius to finish off the Greeks the following year. In the summer of 479BC, the Greeks assembled a huge army and marched out of the Peloponnesus. The Persians retreated to Boeotia and built a fortified camp near Plataea. The Greeks, however, refused to be drawn into the prime terrain for cavalry around the Persian camp, resulting in a stalemate that lasted eleven days.
While attempting a retreat after their supply lines were disrupted, the Greek battle line fragmented. Thinking that the Greeks were in full retreat, Mardonius ordered his forces to pursue them, but the Greeks, particularly the Spartans, Tegeans and Athenians halted and gave battle, routing the lightly armed Persian infantry and killing Mardonius. A large portion of the Persian army was trapped in its camp and killed. The destruction of this army, and the remnants of the Persian navy allegedly on the same day at the Battle of Mycale, decisively ended the invasion.

Background

The Achaemenid Emperor Xerxes I, after his accession, quickly initiated his preparations for an invasion of Greece, including the task of building two pontoon bridges across the Hellespont. A congress of city states met, probably at Corinth, in 481BC, and a confederate alliance of Greek city-states was formed, generally referred to as the Allies.
In August 480BC, after hearing of Xerxes' approach, a small Allied army led by Spartan King Leonidas I blocked the pass of Thermopylae. Famously, the massively outnumbered Greek army held Thermopylae for three days before being outflanked by the Persians, who used a little-known mountain path. Following Thermopylae, the Persian army proceeded to burn and sack Plataea and Thespiae, the Boeotian cities that had not surrendered, before taking possession of the now-evacuated city of Athens. The Allied army, meanwhile, prepared to defend the Isthmus of Corinth. The ensuing naval Battle of Salamis in 480BC ended in a decisive victory for the Allies, marking a turning point in the conflict. Following the defeat of his navy at Salamis, Xerxes retreated to Sardis with a minor portion of his army.
Xerxes left Mardonius in charge of his troops. Mardonius decided to spend the winter in Thessaly. Mardonius tried to win over the Athenians through the mediation of Alexander I of Macedon. Upon their refusal, the Persians marched south again. Athens was again evacuated and left to the enemy, leading to the second phase of the Destruction of Athens. Mardonius now repeated his offer of peace to the Athenian refugees in Salamis. Athens sent emissaries to Sparta demanding assistance, and threatened to accept the Persian terms if it was not provided. These events occurred sometime in the month of June. According to Herodotus, the Spartans were at that time celebrating the festival of Hyacinthus, and delayed making a decision for ten days, until they were persuaded of the danger to all of Greece if the Athenians surrendered. When the Athenian envoys went to the Spartan ephors to deliver an ultimatum, they were told by the ephors that their army had already departed. The 5,000 Spartiates had advanced up the Eurotas River and were now in Oresthasium.

Order of battle

Greeks

According to Herodotus, the Spartans sent 45,000 men – 5,000 Spartiates, 5,000 other Lacodaemonian hoplites and 35,000 helots. Pausanias, the regent for his cousin Pleistarchus, was chosen to command the Spartan troops. The historian Ian Macgregor-Morris argues that the 5,000 Spartiates sent to Plataea were 3/5th of Sparta's troops, while the historian Hans van Wees argues that these 5,000 were all the Spartan citizens fit to serve at the time. The Spartan troops at Plataea might have been the largest army the Spartans had sent beyond the Isthmus of Corinth. Pausanias chose Euryanax to be his deputy commander. Each phyle of the Athenians had its own strategos.
The historian Nicholas Sekunda argues that Herodotus had assumed that each Greek hoplite was accompanied by a lightly armed attendant from the ranks of the psiloi, which had led to Herodotus inflating his numbers for the allied Greek army to 110,000. Sekunda argues that these attendants were present in the Greek camp but not on the battlefield. He further argues that these attendants served as skeuphoros, and were either slaves or the relatives of the hoplites who were too young to serve in the military. In addition to the 35,000 helots, there were also 34,000 light infantry soldiers in the Greek camp. Other than the state of Argos, Mantinea and Elis also did not send their troops. The historian Paul A. Rahe estimates that these two states could have sent 6,000 hoplites, and argues that they did not because of Mardonius' bribes.

Achaemenids

The historian John Francis Lazenby, by comparing the size of the Persian camp to later Roman military camps, calculates the number of troops at 70,000, including 10,000 cavalry. The historian Peter Connolly arrives at a potential total of 120,000 from the size of the camp. Most estimates for the total Persian force are generally in this range. The historian Hans Delbrück, basing his calculations on the distance the Persians marched in a day when Athens was attacked, concluded that 75,000 was the upper limit for the size of the Persian army, including the supply personnel and other non-combatants. Delbrück estimated that the Persian army, including the allied Greeks, totaled 40,000. Konecny estimates that the Persians had around 55,000 to 70,000 infantry, and their camps had anywhere from 120,000 to 150,000 people including the camp followers. Thorax of Larissa and his brothers Eurypylus and Thrasydeius, from the Aleuadae family, were with Mardonius at Plataea.

Nations under the Achaemenids at Plataea	Number
Persians	40,000
Bactrians, Indians, Sakae	20,000
Greek allies: Boeotians, Locrians, Malians, Thessalians, Phocians, Macedonians	20,000
Phrygians, Thracians, Mysians, Paeonians, Ethiopians, Egyptians	Smaller contingents
Cavalry: Persians, Bactrians, Indians, Sakae	5,000
Total	100,000

Composition and order of battle

The details of the arrangement of the Persian line were given by Herodotus. The Persians were on the left wing, facing the 11,500 Lacedaemonian and Tegean hoplites. Konecny estimates that these Persians on the left wing numbered around 20,000 to 30,000. To the right of the Persians were the Medes, facing the 6,200 soldiers of Corinth, Potidaea, Orchomenus and Sicyon. Konecny estimates that these Medes numbered around 12,000 to 18,000.File:Disposition of Achaemenid troops at the Battle of Plataea 479 BCE.jpg|thumb|Disposition of Achaemenid troops beyond the Asopos river at the beginning of the Battle of Plataea. From left to right: Greek allies, Sacae, Indians, Bactrians, Medes and Persians.|alt=Illustration of the Persian line at Plataea under Mardonius. From left to right are the Greek allies, Sakas, Indians, Bactrians, Medes and the Persians; the latter being the largest contingent
Next to the Medes, the Bactrians were deployed in front of the 3,400 soldiers of Epidaurus, Troezen, Lepreum, Tiryns, Mycenae, and Phlius. Konecny estimates that these Bactrians totaled around 6,000 to 9,000. After the Bactrians were the Indians and Sacae, opposite the 3,300 soldiers of Hermione, Eretria, Styra, Chalcis, Anaktoria, Leucadia, Palea, and Aegina. Konecny estimates that these Indians and Sace totaled around 6,000 to 9,000. The Medes, Bactrians, Indians and Sacae formed the center of the Persian line, numbering around 24,000 to 36,000. Against the 11,600 Athenians, Plataeans and Megarians, were deployed the Boeotians, Locrians, Malians, Thessalians, and the Phocians. Konecny estimates that these troops numbered around 11,000 to 13,000. Thus Konecny estimates that the total Persian infantry numbered around 44,000 to 66,000; and the Persian cavalry around 5,000 to 7,000.

Logistics and finance

Andreas Konecny estimates that the Greek supply train destroyed by the Persian cavalry had 120 tons of supplies. He estimates that the Greek army at Plataea had a total of 78,000 soldiers and that these supplies would last for two days if each soldier were to receive one choinix of rations per day, equivalent to. Konecny estimates that each column had to travel one way, and argues that there were three supply columns in transit at all times in order to supply the Greek army. He argues that at least 500 people accompanied each column. He therefore says that a minimum of 2,000 auxiliaries must have arrived at the Greek camp in the four columns which had already supplied them. Konecny says that at least 1,500 auxiliaries were always working the supply lines.
The historian Nicholas Sekunda argues that the animals in the supply column were pack animals and not oxen, and says that the Persians could only use pack animals after the attack, since oxen could not traverse the unpaved route. Sekunda estimates that the food provisions were at least one choinix per day for both the Greek and Persian soldiers. Sekunda also estimates that the supply column disrupted by the Persians had either 58,000 choinikes of barley or 47,000 choinikes of wheat, half the daily provisions for the 110,000 people in the Greek camp, including the non-combatants.
Sekunda argues that the Greeks had a "common treasury". He cites Plutarch's statement, which says that during the Spartan command of the allied Greeks, the latter paid some type of contribution. The historian Peter Brunt argues that such a treasury could not have existed. Sekunda argues that the Spartans might have had enough time to make financial provisions during the Persian invasions. Based on his estimates for the daily provisions requirements, Sekunda estimates that the daily spending on rations by the Greeks at 10,000 drachmas. He argues that the allied Greeks could have arranged such sums. Sekunda observes that the battle of Plataea was the first instance of a Greek army receiving supplies while encamped on the battlefield, instead of living off the land, getting supplies from allied polities on their route or buying from markets set up by camp followers.Konecny argues that the Spartans had thus mobilized almost all of their fighting age helots to assist on the logistical problems posed by such a large Greek army. He argues that only 10,000 helots were deployed for combat, while the remaining 25,000 helots worked the supply lines. He further claims that if all the 35,000 helots had been on the battlefield, the Greeks couldn't have formed their phalanxes before the first Persian charge. Konecny estimates that during Mardonius' march to Skolos he had traveled around from Athens in two days, while most of his army would have taken around a week.
Konecny estimates that the allied Greek army required of water daily. The mountain slopes they had deployed on did not have access to freshwater, and carrying such quantities daily was logistically difficult and made them highly vulnerable to attacks by Persian cavalry. Sekunda estimates the daily water requirement at for the 110,000 people in the Greek camp based on a daily requirement of per person. However, these figures do not account for the water requirements of the animals in the Greek camp.
The historian Paul A. Rahe argues that the Persian supply lines might have extended or more. He argues that the Persians were probably being supplied from Macedonia by land, and from the Hellespont by sea. He notes that the Phocians had not joined the Persian camp, but instead had chosen to stay on Mount Parnassus, where they raided and pillaged the Persian supply columns.
The historian estimates the daily water requirements for the Persians at 115,000 imperial gallons. Young Jr. posits that the Persians needed of grain daily if they had 70,000 soldiers. He also estimates that they would have needed each of grain and fodder daily if they had 10,000 horses. The Persians would therefore have required of food supplies daily. Young Jr. posits that the Persians would then require 1,709 horses to deliver their supplies each day, assuming each horse could carry and took one day to gather supplies and reach the Persian camp. He argues that a total of 22,217 horses would be required to deliver supplies over the entire 13 days the Persians were encamped at Plataea.
Young Jr., however, argues that the Persians were bringing in supplies from Lamia in southern Thessaly, which took seven days each way. He thus claims that the Persians would need 35,000 horses for all their supply columns, a number they could not have put together. Young Jr. argues that the Persians at Plataea thus did not total 70,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry. He argues that the Persians wouldn't have issues with supplies if there were large stores at Thebes, which he estimates was from the Persian camp. He argues that the Greeks at Plataea were being resupplied from the Peloponnese, since farming could not be done in both Attica and Boeotia due to the threat posed by the Persians.