Army of Flanders
The Army of Flanders was a field army of the Spanish Army based in the Spanish Netherlands between the 16th and 18th centuries. It was one of the longest-serving field armies of the early modern era, being founded in 1567 and disbanded in 1706. Taking part in numerous battles of the Eighty Years' War and Thirty Years' War, it employed or pioneered many developing military concepts, including permanent units, barracks and military hospitals long before they were adopted in most of Europe. As a result, the Army of Flanders has been considered the world's de facto first modern professional standing army. Sustained at huge cost and at significant distances from Spain via the Spanish Road, the Army of Flanders also became infamous for successive mutinies and its ill-disciplined activity on and off the battlefield, including the sack of Antwerp in 1576.
Creation of the Army
The Army of Flanders formed the longest standing army in the early modern period, operating from 1567 until 1706. It was established following a wave of iconoclasm in the provinces of the Netherlands in 1565 and 1566. The provinces were ruled by Philip II of Spain, and as trouble mounted he decided to reinforce the existing forces of the governor, Margaret of Parma, with a more substantial force. This was both a political reaction against the perceived rebellion, but also a response to the Calvinist views being shown by the protesters, establishing a religious flavour to the military response.King Phillip's possessions stretched across Europe, and were reflected in the creation of the new army. In 1567 it was intended that 8,000 Spanish foot and 1,200 horse would form the nucleus of a new army for the Netherlands, to be sent from north Italy via Savoy. It was envisaged at this stage that the total number might potentially reach 70,000, composed of 60,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry, under the command of Fernando Álvarez de Toledo, 3rd Duke of Alba. The force would be sent through Europe via a sequence of friendly or neutral territories, which would become known as the 'Spanish Road'; surveying of the route began in 1566.
Eventually the Spanish authorities concluded that recruiting 70,000 troops was both excessive and too expensive. In the end, only 10,000 Spanish and a regiment of German infantry under Count Alberic de Lodron were sent, although their formation, dispatch and march north was a considerable accomplishment for the time. Arriving in the Netherlands, they joined the 10,000 Walloons and Germans already serving Margaret of Parma, who then resigned in favour of Alba. Although the Spanish troops proved to be unruly, they formed an essential professional basis for the new army. Backed by the new Army of Flanders, Alba arrested and tried around 12,000 people, of whom 1,000 were condemned to death, while others had their property confiscated.
Recruitment and support
The size of the Army of Flanders would vary over the period in response to contemporary challenges and threats. The initial force that combined in the Netherlands in 1567 was a little over 20,000 strong; after the defeat of William I of Orange the following year, the Spanish planned for an enduring force of 3,200 Walloon and 4,000 Spanish infantry along the borders of the Netherlands, backed by 4,000 Spanish infantry and 500 light cavalry forming a strategic reserve. In practice, the ensuing Dutch revolt meant that the Army had to enlarge considerably in 1572, reaching, on paper, if not in reality, a strength of 86,000 by 1574.The Army was a multinational force, drawn primarily from the various Catholic possessions of the Habsburgs but also from the Britain and Ireland, as well as Lutheran parts of Germany. There was a clear contemporary hierarchy as to the value of different soldiers; Spanish soldiers were considered the best; then Italians, followed by English, Irish and Burgundian troops; then Germans, then finally local Walloons. Parker has argued that the Germans in fact performed much better than they were given credit for by contemporary commanders. Despite their value on the field, Spanish troops in the Army were particularly unpopular with the local people, and at two key moments were sent out of the Netherlands to assuage local opinion.
Recruitment occurred by various methods, including the commissioning of recruiting captains, who would attempt to enroll volunteers from a given recruiting region each year, and contractors, who would attempt to hire troops from across Europe. It is estimated that around 25% of the Army had served their military apprenticeships elsewhere, with more than 50% recruited outside the Low Countries. At its best, this system could achieve remarkable surges – the increase in the Army in 1572 used all these methods, and its success was a major accomplishment for the Spanish military establishment. During the 1590s, there was increasingly fierce competition for suitable veterans among Catholic France, embroiled in its civil wars of religion, the Habsburg Empire's other commitments and the Army of Flanders, with premiums being paid for transfers into the respective armies. By the early 17th century, the similarities between the Habsburg army of Hungary and the Army of Flanders made competition for recruits particularly intense. The cost of recruiting for the Army created tensions between Philip II's policy in the Netherlands, and his need to maintain a strong presence in the Mediterranean against the Ottoman Empire. Although volunteers were the norm, in extremis other methods could be used; Spain raised a tercio of Catalan criminals to fight in Flanders, a trend Philip II continued for most Catalan criminals for the rest of his reign. Pay remained fixed throughout most of the period, three escudos per day up until 1634, then four escudos thereafter.
At the highest social level, the Army of Flanders enjoyed a sequence of senior officers drawn from the nobility. Having senior noble commanders was considered extremely important in the Army, more so than in equivalent armies in Europe. At the lowest, the Army, like most of the period, had a substantial train of camp followers. Drawn from the lower classes, they made up a large percentage of the overall size of the Army in the field, and represented a considerable logistical burden in campaigns.
As time went on, the Army of Flanders began to enjoy various distinctly modern institutions, often before they were adopted by the rest of Europe. Alba set up a military hospital at Mechelen in the Duchy of Brabant in 1567; it was closed the following year, but after many complaints by mutineers it reopened in 1585, ultimately having 49 staff and 330 beds, paid for partially by the troops. The 'Garrison of our Lady of Hal' was created as a more permanent rest home for crippled veterans. A public trustee was also appointed in 1596 to administer the wills of soldiers who had fallen in service. After 1609, a number of small barracks were created away from the main urban centres to house the Army – a move that was eventually copied by other nations.
The army reached its peak size in January 1640 with 88,280 effectives. Of these 22.4% were Spanish, 48.2% Walloon/Flemish, 19.4% German, 5% Italian, 3.5% British or Irish, and 1.4% Burgundian. Its peak size prior to the Twelve Years Truce was reached in April 1588, with 63,455 effectives. These were 16.2% Spanish, 50.5% Walloon/Flemish, 18.9% German, 8.9% Italian, 2.9% Burgundian, and 2.6% British. In general, Spanish troops usually numbered less than a fifth of the army's strength. From 1567 to 1607 overall, the Spanish monarchy sent 127,752 soldiers to Flanders by the either Spanish Road or by sea. From 1620 to 1639, the Spanish monarchy sent an 68,294 additional troops. Overall, from 1567 to 1639 and including peacetime years, over 200,000 Spanish, Italian, and Portuguese soldiers were sent to Flanders. An additional 11,250 men were recruited into the army of Flanders from the British Isles in 1621 to 1639, mostly Irish.Wilson, Peter H.. Europe's Tragedy: A History of the Thirty Years War. Allen Lane. ISBN 978-0-7139-9592-3. Page 322. German and Wallon/Flemish troops did not take the Spanish Road or ships but rather were recruited locally.
Character of warfare and the Army
The Army of Flanders had been built upon the concept of the Spanish tercio, a pike-heavy infantry formation that well suited the nature of warfare in the Netherlands. The large areas of flat ground, the platteland, was criss-crossed by rivers and drainage channels, dotted by numerous towns and cities well placed to dominate the surrounding landscape, increasingly defended with polygonal fortifications. Siege warfare, rather than set-piece battles, dominated the Eighty Years' War, especially in the 16th century. Away from the major sieges, the war took on an almost guerilla style of small engagements and skirmishes, with much of both the Army of Flanders and the Dutch forces dispersed across the countryside; in 1639, for example, just under half of the Army, then 77,000 strong, was distributed across 208 small garrisons. This pattern reflected the Dutch disposition as well. Siege warfare was extremely expensive, both in terms of casualties and money. In 1622 the siege of Bergen-op-Zoom cost Spinola 9,000 men, whilst the siege of Ostend in 1601-4 cost the Army of Flanders 80,000 in casualties. The siege of Breda during 1624–5 was so expensive financially that the advance had to pause through 1625 – no more money was available to exploit the success.In the 17th century, the conflict gradually changed, as the Spanish-Dutch borders became smaller and more secure and the number of sieges slowly reduced. The Army of Flanders gradually changed in response to these developments in warfare. The Spanish experiences fighting the Swedish, with their more flexible, firepower-oriented tactics of open battle, resulted in a decision to alter the balance of the Flanders tercios in 1634. A new ratio of 75% musketeers to 25% pike was decided on; this delivered more firepower, but was weaker in defending against cavalry, as was demonstrated at Rocroi. In practice this adjusted ratio was only applied to newly formed units. There were also attempts to introduce the heavier musket to replace the lighter arquebus; the poor physical quality of new recruits, who could often not lift the heavier weapon, however, meant that this rule often had to be broken in practice, the local Walloons being felt to be particularly weak and requiring the arquebus. The efforts to deploy the Army of Flanders against France also encouraged changes. Generally speaking, the Army required more infantry for operations in the north against the Dutch, and more cavalry for operations in the south against the French. The Army of Flanders was rarely strong in terms of cavalry, however; in 1572 Alba had discharged all his heavy cavalry, and until the 1630s the Army's cavalry was mainly light cavalry, used to patrol the platteland. Horses themselves were often in short supply – after the relief of Rouen in 1592, for example, two thirds of the Spanish cavalry lacked mounts.
On campaign, the Army of Flanders were considered highly disciplined in the field, being cohesive, with good support facilities. When necessary, they could achieve significant military feats, such as their building of a bridge over the Seine to escape pursuit in 1592. By contrast, even by early modern standards the Army was considered very ill-disciplined off the field, as illustrated by a colloquial Spanish phrase in response to unruly behaviour which came rhetorically to question whether the person believed they were serving in Flanders.