LIV Army Corps
The LIV Army Corps was a Wehrmacht army corps during World War II. It was formed in June 1941. After February 1944, it was upgraded to a command equivalent in rank but not in name to an army, something that the Wehrmacht dubbed an army detachment. It operated under the following names:
- Under its initial name LIV Army Corps, it was active between June 1941 and February 1944.
- It was renamed Army Detachment Narva on 2 February 1944.
- It was again renamed and became Army Detachment Grasser on 25 September 1944.
- It was redesignated again in October 1944, becoming Army Detachment Kleffel.
History
LIV Army Corps, June 1941 – February 1944
Formation
The LIV Army Corps was formed on 1 June 1941 as a reserve staff under supervision of the DHM, the German military mission in Romania. Its creation had been ordered on 4 April 1941.The initial commander of LIV Army Corps was Erick Hansen, who would hold that office until 20 January 1943. The German DHM in Romania was one of two army deployments by Germany that were initially intended for noncombat circumstances, next to the German military mission in Finland. Hansen was previously the head of the DHM, but had only little faith in Germany's Romanian allies. Hansen described the Romanian units as 'useless for difficult offensive actions'. The creation of LIV Army Corps was part of the immediate preparation for the Axis invasion of the Soviet Union, Unternehmen Barbarossa. Romania, under the leadership of Ion Antonescu, had agreed to take part in the invasion. Romania would provide four divisions and six brigades to the initial invasion force, with another nine divisions and two brigades in reserve. Furthermore, the Romanian government allowed German units like the LIV Army Corps to operate from Romanian territory.
The LIV Army Corps was part of 11th Army, which was in turn a part of Army Group South under Gerd von Rundstedt, who had already led Army Group South during the Invasion of Poland. The initial divisions of the LIV Army Corps were the 50th Infantry Division and the 170th Infantry Division.
File:Invasion1941.jpg|thumb|The plan of the German invasion of the Soviet Union, Operation Barbarossa. The 11th Army, which the LIV Army Corps was part of, is second from the bottom.
June–September 1941
It was the task of Army Group South to advance eastward from occupied Poland and northeastward from northern Romania into the Ukrainian SSR. In Ukraine, Kiev was the first major operational target for the Germans, whereas the Romanians would be instructed to attack Odessa. In the opening stages of the invasion, the 11th Army, which the LIV Army Corps was a part of, made up a critical part of one of Rundstedt's shock groups. Schobert's 11th Army was to cooperate with the Third and Fourth Romanian Armies to conduct a delayed supporting attack from Romania into the Soviet Union. The objective of these three armies was to clear Red Army forces from southern Ukraine, to secure the Black Sea coast and to, if possible, encircle Soviet forces in the Kamianets-Podilskyi and Vinnytsia areas. Other German armies under Rundstedt's supervision included the 6th Army and 17th Army.The shock group struck the Soviet defenses in Moldavia on 2 July. A week earlier, on 25 June, the Stavka had formed a new command, the Southern Front, in the sectors opposite the 11th Army. The Southern Front consisted of the Soviet 9th Army and the Soviet 18th Army. It had been Rundstedt's plan to use the German 11th Army to encircle these and other forces in southern Ukraine in cooperation with the German 17th Army. On the first day of action, the 11th Army overwhelmed the Soviet defenders and reached the Prut river. The Soviet forces, overestimating the strength of the German attack, promptly fell back to the Dniester river line before realizing their mistake. In the resulting Soviet counterattack, the line stabilized between the Prut and Dniester rivers. The Soviet 18th Army was forced to dig in in the Mohyliv-Podilskyi area.
On 18 July 1941, the 11th Army crossed the Dniester at Mohyliv-Podilskyi. This resulted in a realization at Stavka that the Southern Front and Southwestern Front were threatened by envelopment. Stavka allowed the Soviet 6th, 12th and 18th Armies to withdraw towards the Bila Tserkva line, some 100 kilometers west of the Dnieper river. At the end of August, the LIV Army Corps reached the Dnieper opposite Nikopol with the 11th Army and was now geographically halfway between Kiev in the north and Crimea in the south.
On 26 August 1941, commanding general of LIV Army Corps Hansen sent an estimation of the attached Romanian units to the command of 11th Army. Among other examples, he applauded the quality of Romanian anti-tank guns, but surmised that the fact the anti-tank detachments were horse-drawn detracted from their performance.
On 12 September, Eugen Ritter von Schobert was killed in action while performing his duties as commander of 11th Army. He was killed when his Fieseler Fi 156 plane attempted to land on ground that happened to contain a freshly deployed Soviet minefield. File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-H01757, Erich von Manstein.jpg|thumb|Erich von Manstein, commander of the 11th Army between September 1941 and November 1942.|alt=
He was subsequently replaced by Erich von Manstein, who as the new commander of the 11th Army now also oversaw the activities of LIV Army Corps. Manstein arrived at his new headquarters in Mykolaiv on the mouth of the Bug river on 17 September 1941.
Under Manstein's supervision, the 11th Army broke through the Red Army defenses at the Isthmus of Perekop starting on 24 September 1941. In this assault, the LIV Army Corps served as the main assault force against the Perekop position and were supported by German artillery formations as well as by aerial units of Luftflotte 4. According to the plan, the LIV Army Corps was to achieve the initial breakthrough, with the XXXXIX Mountain Corps as well as the 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler standing by to rush through the breach. The Romanian Third Army was on defensive duty on the Ukrainian mainland to plug holes left open by German troops moving into Crimea. At this point, with Bessarabia reclaimed, the Romanians were politically and militarily careful to overcommit to the Ukrainian campaigns now that their principal war aim was fulfilled. Regardless, Manstein would later note in his memoirs that Dumitrescu's personal loyalty had greatly enhanced the joint German-Romanian cause in southern Ukraine.
The attack on Perekop that started on 24 September 1941 was not perfectly smooth, however. With the 73rd Infantry Division on the right and the 46th Infantry Division on the left, LIV Army Corps advanced into Soviet defenses in almost completely flat terrain. Although the LIV Army Corps enjoyed strong artillery and air support, the Soviet defenses were still in a decent position and reasonably well-constructed, including a remarkable trench and tunnel system that connected the towns of Perekop and Preobrazhenka and through which Soviet infantry and supplies could move underground. Furthermore, there was a trench on the neck of the isthmus, dubbed the Tartar Wall by the German attackers. This trench, some ten to fifteen meters deep, was the main line of Soviet defense and was held by the Soviet 156th, 271st and 276th Rifle Divisions.
In response, German engineers advanced under the cover of smoke and employed demolition charges and hand grenades against the trenches and bunkers. Losses among the German engineers were high. The German advance across the Tartar Wall and past the defenders north of Armyansk took three days. By then, the Stuka attacks by Luftflotte 4 had taken a significant toll on the number and morale of the Soviet defenders. After the Germans dislodged the defenders from Armyansk, the Tartar Wall was broken; a counterattack by the Soviet 5th Tank Regiment was successful in breaching the German lines, crossing the Tartar Wall and reaching the rear of Germany's 73rd Infantry Division, but this counterattack was fought back using artillery attacks and air strikes. The Soviet armored formation was not enough to reclaim the Tartar Wall line. With the Tartar Wall secure, the Germans had crossed the isthmus, but were now in no position to actually penetrate the breach they opened. The 1st SS Panzer Division, which Manstein initially had intended to be used for this penetration, was now called back to stand by for orders from 1st Panzer Group that was preparing to attack towards Rostov-on-Don. Furthermore, the losses sustained by the 46th and 73rd Infantry Divisions were substantial.
The situation was further complicated by a counter attack by units of the Soviet Southern Front that struck against the units of the 11th Army from a position between the Dniepr and the Sea of Azov. The 9th, 12th and 18th Soviet Armies started an offensive against the Germans on 26 September 1941, starting the Battle of the Sea of Azov. This offensive scored considerable initial successes and threatened to penetrate the Axis line at several points. Although Manstein would in his memoirs blame this setback on the Third Romanian Army and specifically the 4th Mountain Brigade, the forces of both Romania and Germany were heavily affected by the Soviet push.
To stabilize the situation, the XXXXIX Mountain Corps, which had been the other force besides the 1st SS Panzer Division intended by Manstein to lead the attack against Crimea itself, had to turn around halfway to Perekop and to face the advancing Soviet forces. The Axis forces, now supported by units of Kleist's Panzer Group, were able to surround the overextended Soviet formation and to eventually capture most of the Soviet 9th and 18th Armies. The Soviet 12th Army managed to escape the trap, but the Axis were nonetheless able to make more than 65,000 prisoners. The LIV Army Corps was not part of this victorious effort against the Soviet 9th, 12th and 18th Armies; it still stood on the Perekop isthmus, unable to capitalize on the gains made by the 46th and 73rd Infantry Divisions due to the high casualties the corps had sustained.
After the close call at the Sea of Azov, it was now clear that the previously ambivalent command direction of the 11th Army, which had been essentially required to push both east towards Rostov and south towards Sevastopol was unacceptable. Manstein's 11th Army was now unequivocally instructed to commit to an attack across Crimea towards Sevastopol, whereas Rostov was to be left to Kleist's Panzer Group. The 11th Army was also assigned additional reinforcements in the form of the XXX Army Corps and the XXXXII Army Corps. The LIV Army Corps specifically was expanded by adding the 50th Infantry Division.