Anthony Abell
Anthony Foster Abell was a British colonial administrator who served as the governor of Sarawak and concurrently as high commissioner to Brunei from 1950 to 1959. With nine years in office, he held the record for the longest tenure.
During his time in Brunei, Abell faced significant challenges in managing the territory's evolving administration while navigating the complex political dynamics of British interests. Appointed to oversee political reforms in Brunei in the same year that Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddien III ascended to the throne, Abell's role was pivotal. However, despite his considerable skill and moral integrity, he struggled to align with Brunei's aspirations and was often outmanoeuvred by Omar Ali Saifuddien. His tenure ended shortly after the sultan succeeded in securing Brunei's first written constitution in 1959, which granted Brunei's greater executive authority. Though Abell was unable to implement his intended reforms, he left Brunei disillusioned but continued to play a significant role in Brunei–United Kingdom relations during this critical period.
Early life and education
Anthony Foster Abell was born in Bridgnorth, England, on 11 December 1906, the second son of George Foster Abell of Foxcote Manor, Andoversford, and Jessie Elizabeth Brackenbury. He had an older brother, George Abell, who was a cricketer and civil servant. Abell was educated at Repton School and Magdalen College, Oxford.Career
Early career
Abell began his colonial service in 1929 and served in the Oyo province of Colonial Nigeria until 1949. He then appointed governor and commander-in-chief of Sarawak on 19 January 1950, succeeding Duncan George Stewart, who had been assassinated in December 1949. He was appointed as the third governor of Sarawak by King George VI on 22 February 1950. Later that year, on 4 April, Abell officially assumed office, with the oath-taking ceremony held in Singapore on 5 April.High Commissioner of Brunei
Later in 1950, he was appointed high commissioner to Brunei, where he was tasked with establishing a written constitution for the state as part of the Colonial Office's broader efforts to improve governance and legal clarity. After receiving a comprehensive briefing, Abell embarked on the sensitive task of presenting the idea to the sultan, while Sarawakian legal officers, under the direction of the Colonial Office, drafted the necessary laws to be presented to the State Council.Unlike his predecessor, Abell took a more active role in Brunei's administration, which coincided with the ascension of Omar Ali Saifuddien and required a renegotiation of their political relationship. The dynamics between the sultan, British Resident Eric Ernest Falk Pretty, and the high commissioner shifted significantly with Abell's appointment in 1950. Unlike his predecessors, who were based in Singapore, Abell was stationed in close proximity to Brunei, with his headquarters in Sarawak, allowing him to become more directly involved in the administration. This change was further reinforced by a personnel agreement between Brunei and Sarawak, which saw many officers seconded from Sarawak, thereby granting Abell greater authority over their responsibilities.
In order to obtain political and financial concessions from Omar Ali Saifuddien, British authorities purposefully encouraged Abell to establish a close personal relationship with him. As a result, Abell increasingly took on the British Resident's customary advisory role, unintentionally undermining the position's authority by speaking directly with Omar Ali Saifuddien and his advisors. While Abell recognised the sultan's growing political autonomy, he found it challenging to reverse this shift, understanding that Brunei's power structure had been altered by the sultan increasing independence and political maturity. Abell was also present at the Omar Ali Saifuddien's coronation in 1951, a significant event that highlighted the new sultan's qualities. Abell played a crucial role in supporting the sultan's rise, with other officials, like Malcolm MacDonald, expressing their strong belief in the sultan's leadership abilities during the ceremony.
Abell believed that the Brunei Police Force's lower-level officers were untrustworthy and susceptible to A. M. Azahari's influence. In the lead-up to the BRUFICO Affair, rumours of disturbances, including police desertions and the potential for rebellion, spread before an appeal hearing in March 1953. Abell raised concerns about police loyalty, particularly after six Seria constables joined the rebel forces. He credited reinforcements from Sarawak and North Borneo for maintaining Brunei's stability during the disturbances. The increased police presence helped prevent major conflicts, and by 12 March, as tensions eased, the Sarawak detachment remained in Seria while the North Borneo forces returned home. In British circles, there were unfounded rumours suggesting that Indonesia was involved in the BRUFICO Affair. Although intelligence reports in March 1953 indicated that Indonesia might have influenced the Bruneian police, British officials, including Abell and Hector Hales of the British Malayan Petroleum Company, believed that Indonesia's role was indirect and that Bruneians were largely responsible for the movement. Azahari's actions were seen as a local phenomenon, influenced by Indonesian practices, but Abell would have informed the Colonial Office had there been concrete evidence of Indonesian involvement.
Because of the shifting political climate, Abell was in favor of revising Britain's ties with Brunei. He and other British officials felt that the advise section needed to be made clearer in order to define the administration's responsibilities. This prompted the idea of drafting a constitution outlining the British Resident's authority, which was perceived as a means of bolstering British authority in the face of regional instability and Azahari's demands for democratic reform. Negotiating the constitutional amendments with Omar Ali Saifuddien and his advisors proved a drawn-out process, nevertheless, because Brunei was not a colony.
Sarawak-North Borneo-Brunei Conference
The first Sarawak-North Borneo-Brunei Conference took place in Kuching on 21 April 1953, with Brunei represented by Omar Ali Saifuddien, British Resident John Coleraine Hanbury Barcroft, and Ibrahim Mohammad Jahfar. Abell and MacDonald encouraged the sultan to attend to ensure the conference's success and legitimacy. Later, on 13 May, Abell initially focused on political solutions for Brunei, such as revising the treaty and drafting a written constitution, without mentioning a significant $100 million development plan. However, by June, he acknowledged the plan, which was awaiting Omar Ali Saifuddien's approval. It appeared that the sultan took advantage of the situation, viewing the development fund as a way to address the growing political demands and the aspirations of his subjects, who were aware of Brunei's increasing wealth. Abell's concerns shifted as he navigated this complex balance between political reform and the sultan's control over Brunei's resources.In 1954, Abell received permission from Elizabeth II to wear the Most Esteemed Family Order of Brunei, First Class, awarded by Omar Ali Saifuddien for his valuable services. That same year, the first step in Brunei's constitution-making process was taken with the creation of District Advisory Councils in September. These councils, designed to support the administration and offer a platform for resolving public complaints, were made up of both elected and appointed members. However, they soon became forums for nationalist debates, often touching on matters belonging to the State Council. Abell voiced concerns about the councils' tendency to overreach and impede decision-making, as well as the mounting pressure on the British government due to Malay members using the State Council to criticise British policies as the councils gained power. In October, during a conference of British governors in Kuching, Abell strongly opposed the proposal to merge Brunei with its neighbouring territories of North Borneo and Singapore. He argued that Brunei would view such a move as an attempt to seize its wealth, warning that it would require troops to erase the geographical boundaries and could push Brunei into aligning with another power. Abell's stance highlighted his concerns over Brunei's autonomy and the risks of forcing closer political association.
In November 1954, Hugh Hickling was asked to visit Brunei to study the country's constitutional procedures and assist in drafting a new one. His report, completed in January 1955, had a significant influence on British thinking, particularly in persuading officials like Abell—and the Colonial Office through him—of Brunei's special relationship with Britain. The report reinforced the idea that the Brunei government had direct authority over certain domestic issues in Brunei, strengthening Abell's argument for a neo-colonial constitutional system. On 23 March 1955, Abell delivered two separate dispatches to the Colonial Office. Dispatch No. 47, which contained confidential annexes not shared with Omar Ali Saifuddien, and Dispatch No. 46, which included reports and annexes that were shared with him, allowed Abell to voice his concerns about the State Council's obstructive actions. In this second dispatch, he recommended changes to the government's decision-making procedures and highlighted a lack of transparency, which validated some of the Sultan's concerns regarding British objectives. In his efforts to consolidate British control, Abell removed Brunei's two senior wazirs from political authority, replacing them with a ceremonial Privy Council, aiming to limit their influence. He also suggested granting the British veto power in the new constitution, keeping the high commissioner and resident in place indefinitely, and implementing a Nationality Enactment to grant British-protected citizens, mostly Chinese, the right to vote—though he decided not to inform Omar Ali Saifuddien of this plan.
The Omar Ali Saifuddien's trust in Abell was severely undermined when his covert schemes were uncovered, damaging their relationship significantly. Although Abell had hoped to convince the sultan to approve the new constitution, immediate difficulties arose. The British misinterpreted Bruneian national sentiment by attempting to incorporate Brunei into a British-Borneo bloc and relying too heavily on Sarawak's constitutional model. This led to increasing suspicion and resentment among Bruneians, particularly nationalists like vernacular teachers, who pushed for genuine self-rule through British-led constitutional reforms. Abell remained determined to stay in Brunei as both resident and high commissioner. His vision was for the resident to perform executive functions similar to a colonial secretary, while the high commissioner would provide general direction akin to a colonial governor. Rather than being involved in day-to-day administration, Abell argued that Brunei's growing development needs required an experienced British advisor, who would have the time to "educate" and "persuade" Omar Ali Saifuddien and senior officials. To be more effective, he suggested that the high commissioner should live in Brunei. Earlier, in 1948, Abell had proposed severing Brunei's administrative ties with Sarawak to strengthen Brunei's connections with other British colonies in Borneo.
The process was restarted after Abell discovered in May 1955 that Omar Ali Saifuddien had rejected the proposed constitutional revisions. Omar Ali Saifuddien was reassured when Abell pledged to restrict the high commissioner's and resident's authority to crucial domains like security and finance in order to reduce conflicts. But Abell also had to give up to the sultan's insistence that the state religious adviser and the two wazirs be represented on all important councils, which undermined the British goal of reorganising the Brunei government.