Alexander of Lycopolis
Alexander of Lycopolis was an ancient Greek philosopher, who lived in Egypt during the late 3rd century CE, belonged to the Neoplatonic school and is remembered as a determined opponent of Manichaeism. This then still very young religion had been founded in the Persian Sasanian Empire by Mani, a contemporary of Alexander, had spread westward into the Roman Empire, and had been brought to Egypt by missionaries. Alexander’s polemic against Manichaeism provides valuable information about its early history and shows that he was well informed about the doctrine he opposed. His aim was to defend the Platonic worldview against novel religious teachings which he regarded as confused and irrational.
He was the writer of a short treatise, in twenty-six chapters, against the Manicheans. He says in the second chapter of this work that he derived his knowledge of Manis' teaching apo ton gnorimon.
The work is a specimen of Greek analytical procedure, "a calm but vigorous protest of the trained scientific intellect against the vague dogmatism of the Oriental theosophies".
Photius says that he was Bishop of Lycopolis. This view lived on well into the 19th century, although Louis-Sébastien Le Nain de Tillemont had concluded in 1697 that the author was a pagan and a Platonist. Otto Bardenhewer also opined this in.
Life and work
Alexander's place of origin was Lykonpolis, in present-day Asyut in Egypt. Alexander likely received his philosophical education in Alexandria, after which he presumably returned to his hometown, where he worked as a philosophy teacher. He was of the Neoplatonist school of thought, though his philosophy was also influenced by Middle Platonism.When well known Manichaean missionaries Papos and Thomas pretended to be students, appeared in his circle and succeeded in converting some of their peers, he considered it necessary to oppose them and refute their doctrines. For this purpose he composed his sole surviving work, Against the Teachings of Mani, the earliest known polemical work against Manichaeism, and the only testimony to Alexander's existence. This text was to become an important source for the study of early Manichaean thought, as Alexander apparently drew on reliable information originating from an authentic Manichaean account of the religion.
Despite the continued circulation of early attributions to an Alexander, Bishop of Lyconpolis, who allegedly converted to Manichaeism from paganism, modern research has concluded that Alexander was neither Manichaean nor Christian, but was a pagan philosopher.
Since he refers to the death of the religion’s founder Mani but appears unaware of the persecution of Manichaeans in the Roman Empire under Emperor Diocletian, which began in 297 CE, the composition of his work is generally dated to the period between 277 and 297 CE.
Some parts of the transmitted text of the treatise appear to have been revised by a Christian.
Alexander’s Presentation and Critique of Manichaeism
Historical and Religious Background
The treatise Against the Teachings of Mani consists of three sections: an introduction on Christianity and its decadence, a presentation of Manicheism and a philosophical refutation of Manichaeism. The work serves both as a source on the doctrines of early Manichaeism, confirmed in part by Manichaean texts discovered later, and as an important text on the history of early Neoplatonism. In its time, the text sought to demonstrate the incompatibility of Manichaeism with the main points and major currents of Greek philosophy. He viewed with concern that Mani’s ideas were gaining acceptance even among philosophers, and he attempted to stem this development.Alexander regarded Manichaeism as a very distorted form of Christianity. In doing so, he took the Manichaean self-understanding as his point of departure: Mani had presented himself as a continuer and fulfiller of Christ’s mission, calling himself an apostle of Christ. Accordingly, Alexander opened his treatise with observations on "the philosophy of the Christians", which he characterized as "simple", and considered it a trivial but useful doctrine suited to plain minds. As Alexander described the activity of Jesus, he did not regard him as a savior but as a commendable teacher of virtue for farmers and craftsmen. In his view, the emphasis of Christianity and Manichaeism on morality and religious concerns coincided with their neglect of philosophical rigor, which Alexander saw as one of their weaknesses. According to Alexander, what began as a simple philosophy eventually had degenerated into a hopelessly convoluted and useless dogmatic system, and had split into multiple factions and sects who could not provide precise philosophical theory for their teachings and therefore nullified them; the leader of one of one of these sects was Mani. In Alexander’s assessment, Christianity was already in a process of dissolution, which he compared to the decline of sophistic disputation.
Against Manichaeism
Representation of the Manichaean myth
In his writings, Alexander provides an concise outline of the Manichaean cosmogony and soteriology, consisting of a myth of battle between the principles of god and matter. According to the myth, matter wished to conquer the realm of god, who being devoid of all evil could not punish it for trying to do so. As such the soul was sent to unite with matter, so that it would separate from it in the future and cause it to die. The soul was ultimately influenced by matter and imprisoned by it. Out of mercy, God sent a second power, the Demiurge, which created the universe, and the untainted portion of soul became the sun and the moon, while that which had been soiled by matter became the stars and the rest of heaven. The sun and the moon were sent beyond the universe, and everything else, including living things with divine power randomly moving inside them, continually come into being, and die when the divine power leaves them and ascends through a third power from the moon to the sun and finally to God. The role of Jesus within the doctrine is as an "intellect" who liberated a large portion of the soul and whose crucifixion exemplified the intermingling between matter and the divine power. The belief in this myth dictated vegetarianism and abstinence from procreation, as the birth of children would only continue the human race and delay the liberation of the imprisoned divine power, suicide however was still prohibited.Alexander points out that Matter in the Manichaean doctrine is not how Plato defines it, as "that which becomes all things when it assumes quality and shape," nor how Aristotle defines it, as "the element in relation to which form and privation occur," rather it is defined by Manichaeans as the random motion in each individual thing.
Refutation of Manichaeism
For Alexander, the most extreme example of misguided sectarianism arising from Christian tradition was Manichaeism. After briefly discussing the life of Mani and Manichaean missionary activity, he summarizes its teachings and then proceeds to refute them. In presenting the doctrine, he notes that Manichaeism defined matter as "disorderly motion", which, he argues, differs fundamentally from Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions of matter.Before undertaking his systematic critique, he described the dilemma he believed he faced. The doctrine he intended to address was irrational and relied not on arguments but on the authority of scriptures, making it difficult to refute. Instead of a demonstrable chain of reasoning, he found only assertions. A precise philosophical refutation would not reach those who had embraced Manichaeism uncritically; yet if he were to descend to the opponents’ level and employ manipulative techniques, he would fall into the very error he accused them of. To escape this dilemma, he adopted an extremely careful method.
His philosophical polemic is directed first against Manichaean dualism, the claim that two opposed, co-equal first principles exist: the good God and matter conceived as an inherently evil principle of darkness locked in conflict with him. Among other arguments, he maintains that if both are real creative first principles, each would require its own matter as a passive substrate, resulting in four principles, an implication Mani had failed to recognize. Moreover, if matter is "disorderly motion", as the Manichaeans assert, this presupposes the existence of something moved, namely, the elements. In that case, it becomes unclear whether the second principle is the mover or the thing moved. From his monistic standpoint, Alexander rejects the dualistic foundation of the Manichaean worldview: matter, too, derives from the divine and therefore should not be regarded as evil. More decisively than many other Neoplatonists, he denies any essential association between matter and evil. He argues that either it is in the nature of the highest principle to flow into matter or it is not. If it is, matter, being produced by the supremely good, cannot be evil; if it is not, the mixture of the two first principles could never have occurred.
He further contends that "disorderly" change is impossible in the realm of matter, for this characteristic belongs to none of the recognized types of change; all change proceeds according to law. He also argues that interaction between the two Manichaean principles would require a third mediating principle; otherwise, they would have no connection. If such a third principle existed, one would have to ask whether it is corporeal or incorporeal. In either case, it could not fulfill the mediating role and would thus be superfluous. The same question of corporeality or incorporeality applies to the two principles of Mani themselves. However one answers, whether both are incorporeal, both corporeal, or one corporeal and the other not, every option leads to an absurd consequence within the Manichaean system.
Alexander maintains that the Manichaean claim that God sent a power down to matter to put an end to evil must also result in contradictions. From an empirical point of view, he notes, no effects of this supposed intervention are visible.
He ridicules the Manichaean notion that an evil power could confront God as an equal adversary, ascend into his realm, and launch an attack. For Alexander, there can be no philosophical reason for an evil principle to wage war against the good, nor could it ever possess the ability to do so. A realm of absolute evil would necessarily be weak, chaotic, and closed in upon itself; otherwise, it would contain partially good qualities. The absolutely evil would have neither motive nor capacity to approach the good. Any impulse toward the good is itself a sign of orientation toward what is right and is therefore good, meaning that such an impulse must originate from the good principle and thus cannot exist in an absolutely evil domain. Consequently, in a consistently dualistic system such as Manichaeism, no contact between the opposed principles would be possible and no conflict could arise between them.
He further argues that God cannot be at war with matter, for this would require attributing to him emotions incompatible with divine goodness. Manichaeans ascribed anger to God and the desire to punish hostile matter. Such passions, Alexander claims, are already inappropriate for a virtuous human being and therefore utterly inconceivable for God, the supreme good.
Against the Manichaean linear conception of world history, Alexander sets the cyclical worldview of Platonists and Aristotelians. Whereas the world inhabited by humans moves toward its end, the final victory of the good principle, in Manichaean thought, it is eternal for Platonists and Aristotelians. Alexander argues that the idea of a gradual historical improvement finds no support in experience; indeed, evil has not diminished since the world’s beginning, at least if one follows biblical history. Just as Cain slew Abel, so murder continued in the present, and wars had not decreased. Since no historical development toward the good is visible, evil cannot be interpreted as a temporary phase in a larger cosmological process, and the expectation that it will diminish and disappear is illusory. Moreover, Manichaeism is internally inconsistent: it posits both the possibility of moral progress and the existence of a disorderly motion of evil matter that produces wickedness. Such motion would either destroy progress or cease upon its completion, an outcome incompatible with the Manichaean notion of matter.
Alexander identifies numerous inconsistencies in Manichaean cosmology and cosmogony, which he analyzes in detail. He accuses the Manichaeans of advancing claims in this domain despite their lack of astronomical knowledge. Instead of making their theses plausible, they merely present their model without argument. He asserts that such people characteristically resort to citing mythological poetry when lacking evidence.