CIA transnational activities in counterproliferation
This article deals with activities of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, specifically dealing with arms control, weapons of mass destruction and weapons proliferation. It attempts to look at the process of tasking and analyzing, rather than the problem itself, other than whether the CIA's efforts match its legal mandate or assists in treaty compliance. In some cases, the details of a country's programs are introduced because they present a problem in analysis. For example, if Country X's policymakers truly believe in certain history that may not actually be factual, an analyst trying to understand Country X's policymakers needs to be able to understand their approach to an issue.
CIA organizations have had involvement in strategic weapons intelligence since the U-2 program in the late 1950s, and that the relationships and names of organizations frequently change. Some of the assignments and reports have been, or may still be, classified. Note, for example, that the full Rumsfeld Committee or Iraq Intelligence Commission reports are available only in executive summaries or in heavily redacted documents.
Counterproliferation covers a variety of disciplines, some in the current CIA, some previously in the CIA and now in the DNI, and others in other Federal organizations with mission statements or enabling legislation that give them responsibilities. In US military doctrine, counterproliferation is defined as "Those actions taken to defeat the threat and/or use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States, our military forces, friends, and allies."
The National Counterproliferation Center, now in the DNI but formerly a part of CIA, and having CIA personnel detailed to it, "will coordinate strategic planning within the Intelligence Community to enhance intelligence support to United States efforts to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related delivery systems. It will work with the IC to identify critical intelligence gaps or shortfalls in collection, exploitation, or analysis, and develop solutions to ameliorate or close these gaps. It will also work with the IC to identify long-term proliferation threats and requirements and develop strategies to ensure the IC is positioned to address these threats and issues. NCPC will reach out to elements both inside the Intelligence Community and outside the IC and the U.S. Government to identify new methods or technologies that can enhance the capabilities of the IC to detect and defeat future proliferation threats.". Its authorization comes from several sources:
Particularly for nuclear weapons and long-range missiles, there is a category of national means of technical verification that uses technical sensors that are operated by organizations other than the CIA. Satellites launched and operated by the National Reconnaissance Office and whose output is evaluated by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, which absorbed the former CIA Office of Imagery Analysis and the joint CIA-military National Photointerpretation Center. The CIA, however, has a significant role in HUMINT collection and in analytic disciplines that help recognize the early parts of a weapons development program.
Organizational responsibility
Before the Office of the Director of National Intelligence was created in 2004, the CIA was both the lead agency and part of the Counterproliferation Center. Under the DNI, November 2005 Mission Managers for counterterrorism, counterproliferation, Iran, and North Korea were established. The CIA is a member of the Center, who contributes both HUMINT and analysis, but the Center is now part of the DNI. CIA reports before the formation of the DNI reflect a lead role as opposed to a member role.On December 21, 2005, the DNI announced the formal establishment of the NCPC. Consistent with the Senate Report of Pre-war Intelligence on Iraq Recommendation, the NCPC is small and, rather than conduct analysis, is meant to provide strategic direction for the entire counterproliferation community. In part, the NCPC is intended to direct the correction seen in the WMD Commission's Iraq case study, which, among others, demonstrated the need for increased interagency HUMINT coordination, better and more uniform tradecraft standards, and increased joint training for operators.
International representation
The Office of Counterproliferation Initiatives works with the National Counterproliferation Center, the CIA's Suppliers and Interdiction Group, and other intelligence organizations. Its purpose is to coordinate and guide, and also to be the formal representative of the United States in arms control issues.The US is a signatory to a number of multilateral arms control agreements, such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, Biological Weapons Convention, Missile Technology Control Regime, the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, and the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. The WINACC provides CIA expertise in support of compliance with these missions, as well as with a number of bilateral treaties with the Russia or the former Soviet Union. These began with the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, go through the various Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. These means include SIGINT, IMINT, and MASINT, where CIA scientific groups have had, or continue to have, responsibilities. Certain of these assignments were classified when first made, and the current responsibilities come from both public statements and declassified documents on earlier assignments.
Other interagency roles
The United States Department of State's Office of Counterproliferation Initiatives is responsible for the treaty-level implementation of arms control, but specifically works with military and CIA agencies. It with the National Counterproliferation Center, the CIA's Suppliers and Interdiction Group, and other intelligence organizations as appropriate. Note that the precise nomenclature of the various groups will change over time, but there has been a continuing CIA analytic and technical collection role in these areas.The office receives support from, coordinates efforts of, and provides guidance to, other offices for these meetings. It leads policy development to attack the trade in nuclear materials, and coordinate closely with CTR as the lead ISN office for securing facilities and materials worldwide.
To this end, ISN/CPI will receive support from, coordinate efforts of, and provide guidance to, other offices as necessary for these meetings. It will lead policy development to attack the trade in nuclear materials, and coordinate closely with CTR as the lead ISN office for securing facilities and materials worldwide. It also will work closely with White House offices and other agencies, including the Departments of Defense, Treasury, Commerce, Homeland Security, and Justice, and with the Intelligence Community, to develop and implement appropriate diplomatic, defense, law enforcement, and rapid response options, and other international measures designed to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Again remembering that the arms control mission involves a large amount of interagency coordination, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency has, as its mission, "Our mission is to safeguard America and its allies from Weapons of Mass Destruction by providing capabilities to reduce, eliminate, and counter the threat, and mitigate its effects. " Note this includes conventional explosives as well as the chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons commonly associated with WMD." The CIA unit assigned to work most closely with DTRA is the Weapons, Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center, which provides intelligence support to deal with national and non-national threats, as well as supporting threat reduction/arms control.
CIA units in the Directorate of Intelligence and the Directorate for Science & Technology work in the verification for all of these functions, starting in 1962, when the Central Intelligence Agency, Deputy Directorate for Research, formally took on ELINT and COMINT responsibilities. "The consolidation of the ELINT program was one of the major goals of the reorganization ... it is responsible for:
"CIA's Office of Research and Development was formed to stimulate research and innovation testing leading to the exploitation of non-agent intelligence collection methods ... All non-agent technical collection systems will be considered by this office and those appropriate for field deployment will be so deployed. The Agency's missile detection system, Project based on backscatter radar is an example. This office will also provide integrated systems analysis of all possible collection methods against the Soviet antiballistic missile program is an example." It is not clear where ELINT would end and MASINT would begin for some of these projects, but the role of both is potentially present. MASINT, in any event, was not formalized as a US-defined intelligence discipline until 1986.
CIA took on a more distinct MASINT responsibility in 1987. The National Security Archive commented, "In 1987, Deputy Director for Science and Technology Evan Hineman established ... a new Office for Special Projects. concerned not with satellites, but with emplaced sensors—sensors that could be placed in a fixed location to collect signals intelligence or measurement and signature intelligence about a specific target. Such sensors had been used to monitor Chinese missile tests, Soviet laser activity, military movements, and foreign nuclear programs. The office was established to bring together scientists from the DS&T's Office of SIGINT Operations, who designed such systems, with operators from the Directorate of Operations, who were responsible for transporting the devices to their clandestine locations and installing them.