256th Rifle Division


The 256th Rifle Division was the last of a group of 10 regular rifle divisions formed from cadres of NKVD border and internal troops as standard Red Army rifle divisions, very shortly after the German invasion, in the Moscow Military District. It was largely based on what would become the shtat of July 29, 1941, with several variations. It was initially assigned to 29th Army in Western Front but was soon reassigned to 22nd Army in the same Front. It narrowly escaped being encircled and destroyed in late August, after which it retreated eastward as part of 27th Army before returning to the 22nd. In October the division, with one regiment detached, played a key role in the defense of Kalinin, during which it was transferred to 30th Army in the new Kalinin Front. During the Soviet winter counteroffensive the 256th came under command of 39th Army, which was attempting to trap the German forces holding Rzhev. This proved unsuccessful, and in July 1942 the 39th was itself encircled, forcing it to break out at the cost of heavy casualties. The division now moved to the north for rebuilding. It was then assigned to the Volkhov Front, and participated in the many battles to clear the German forces blockading Leningrad, culminating in Operation Iskra in January 1943, for which it was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. During the rest of the year the 256th fought in several more offensives to widen the land corridor to the city, but only made marginal gains. Finally, in January 1944, it took part in the Leningrad–Novgorod Offensive, advancing decisively to the west. It was encircled by a German counterattack in early February, but held out due to air supply and the assistance of partisan forces. After being relieved by 59th Army the division, and its 8th Army, were transferred to Leningrad Front and advanced on the Estonian city of Narva, which was already under attack by the Front. The fighting there went on for months until finally the city was taken in late July and the 256th was awarded its name as an honorific. Following this victory it advanced through Estonia and into Latvia as part of the 42nd Army in 2nd Baltic Front. During late 1944 and well into 1945 it was part of the forces blockading the German units trapped in the Courland Pocket. Shortly before the German surrender it returned to 22nd Army, which was being moved to the Reserve of the Supreme High Command, and it travelled south to the Odesa Military District. It was there until October when it was disbanded.

Formation

The 256th Rifle Division began forming within days of the start of the German invasion on June 29, 1941, at Sofrino, in the Moscow Military District. This was based on an NKVD order of that date: Although the initial order for its formation came from the NKVD, when it left for the front in early July it was completely under Red Army administration. Its order of battle was as follows:
  • 930th Rifle Regiment
  • 934th Rifle Regiment
  • 937th Rifle Regiment
  • 792nd Artillery Regiment
  • 312th Antitank Battalion
  • 334th Reconnaissance Company
  • 422nd Sapper Battalion
  • 674th Signal Battalion
  • 272nd Medical/Sanitation Battalion
  • 252nd Chemical Defense Company
  • 224th Auto Transport Company
  • 301st Field Bakery
  • 244th Divisional Veterinary Hospital
  • 880th Field Postal Station
  • 612th Field Office of the State Bank
Maj. Gen. Stepan Aleksandrovich Ivanov, an NKVD officer, was not appointed to command until July 7; he had previously commanded the 2nd NKVD Railway Security Division. By July 10 the division was under the Red Army's control and on the 15th it was assigned to 29th Army in Western Front.
Judging from reports on other NKVD-based divisions, the 256th was far from complete when it entered combat. The commander of the 30th Army, Maj. Gen. V. A. Khomenko, reported on August 5 regarding his 250th and 251st Divisions that they had been required to move up to 350 km on foot to their concentration areas and "were taken from their assembly points in the very midst of assembly, and, incomplete, they did not approach being 'knocked together' and went into battle unprepared for combat." In addition, the 251st had only about 400 NKVD cadre soldiers.

Battle of Smolensk

On July 15, the lead elements of 2nd Panzer Group's 29th Motorized Division reached the southern part of Smolensk. Over the following days German pressure mounted against the three armies of Western Front, commanded by Marshal S. K. Timoshenko, which were almost entirely encircled in that region. On July 19 the commander of Reserve Front, Lt. Gen. I. A. Bogdanov, was alerted by the STAVKA to begin preparing an offensive operation with his 29th, 30th and 28th Armies to rescue Timoshenko's force. The 29th, commanded by General Maslennikov, was to advance from the Toropets region toward Velikiye Luki with its 243rd, 256th and 252nd Divisions.
At 2125 hours on July 20, on behalf of the STAVKA, Army Gen. G. K. Zhukov sent a directive to Timoshenko, who was now acting as commander of the Western Direction. Four reserve armies, including the 29th, were to launch attacks toward Dukhovshchina and Smolensk along converging axes. Maslennikov was to attack southward from the Staro-Toropa region toward Demidov, reach Chikhachi and Lake Zhizhitskoye at Artemovo Station line by day's end on July 23, protect the Toropets axis, and dispatch a detachment of up to one battalion to protect the Group's flank in the Knyazhovo region. In a further report to the STAVKA at 0800 on July 26 Group Maslennikov was reported as having completed concentrating along the ChikhachiLake Zhizhitskoye line, with the 256th in the Chikhachi, Nazimovo Station, and Selishche region, 12 km south to 23 km west of Toropets. Early the next day Timoshenko reported to Stalin that the offensive had "developed at a slower than desired tempo during the last two days", and stated that Maslennikov had dispatched two divisions to attack the German YartsevoDukhovshchina grouping while also attacking toward Ilyino. However, by July 31 it was clear that this first major counteroffensive in the Smolensk region had failed, although Army Group Center had to commit its last reserves. Before the end of the month the division had been transferred to 22nd Army, still in Western Front.

Fighting near Velikiye Luki

22nd Army had retaken Velikiye Luki on July 21. This overlooked victory was the first large city liberated by the Red Army. Following this the Army commander, Lt. Gen. F. A. Ershakov, attempted to create a new defense line along the Lovat River although his troops had taken heavy losses and he was in need of reinforcements. In a report dated at 2000 hours on August 3, Timoshenko stated that the 256th had one rifle regiment fighting with a German division in the Ploshosh region, with another regiment moving to assist, while the third regiment held its previous positions. At this time it was part of the 62nd Rifle Corps. Over the following days the remnants of the 16th and 20th Armies managed to withdraw eastwards from the Smolensk pocket, and at 2000 on August 7 Western Front issued another summary, in which it stated that the division was attacking toward Volok.

Staraya Russa Counterstroke

The STAVKA issued orders on August 9 and 10 to the Northwestern Front to orchestrate a counterstroke aimed at destroying German forces in the Soltsy, Staraya Russa, and Dno regions with the help of recently arrived reinforcements. Lt. Gen. N. F. Vatutin, the chief of staff of Northwestern Front, put forward a plan for a massive offensive south of Leningrad, but the STAVKA dialled this back with a more modest plan dictated at 2030 hours on August 9. Among other provisions the plan stated:Despite careful preparations, Vatutin's offensive achieved only fleeting success. 27th Army attacked early on August 12. 16th Army's II Army Corps occupied all-round defenses at Kholm that stymied 27th Army's advance. In this attack and the subsequent withdrawal to the Valdai Hills the Army lost up to 30 percent of its strength.
On August 20 the commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal F. von Bock, began regrouping his 19th and 20th Panzer Divisions, along with four infantry divisions, to launch a counterstrike against 22nd Army under command of XXXX Motorized Corps. This offensive began on August 22 and took Timoshenko, who was preparing a strike of his own, by considerable surprise. The panzers overran much of the 256th's former 62nd Corps and the Army was soon largely encircled and destroyed. With this large gap torn in the front the 27th Army had no choice but to fall back to the east.
On September 5 General Ivanov was transferred to command of the 257th Rifle Division, which he held until November when he was moved again to lead the 240th Rifle Division. He was removed from this command at the end of April 1942, and never held another front-line command until he retired in October 1945. Maj. Gen. Sergei Georgievich Goryachev took over the 256th. He had previously led the 50th, 5th and 23rd Rifle Divisions and had been most recently in command of a Fortified Region in the Valdai Hills.
Following their victory over 22nd Army, the two panzer divisions disappeared from the front lines by the first week of September. Timoshenko was so concerned about this potential threat he had his chief of staff, Lt. Gen. V. D. Sokolovskii, prepare a report which was sent to the STAVKA in the afternoon of September 10 which stated, in part:On the same day, 22nd Army was directed to create an Army reserve in the Peno region.

Operation Typhoon

By the start of October the division had returned to 22nd Army. The next day Army Group Center launched its part of Operation Typhoon, which was intended to be the final drive on Moscow. The main thrust of 3rd Panzer Group struck the boundary between 19th and 30th Armies and within days had penetrated to the north of Vyazma. 22nd Army, on the far right flank of Western Front, escaped these initial blows. By October 9 the 256th, 133rd, 174th and 186th Rifle Divisions were withdrawing to the east, covered by rearguards, continuing to arrive at the previously prepared OstashkovSelizharovoKamenitsaPlekhanovo line. There was no precise information about their location; as soon as the movement of troops or headquarters began, communications became disrupted. During the day, German activity was limited to reconnaissance probes.