Siege of Havana


The siege of Havana was the successful capture of the Spanish-held city of Havana, Cuba in 1762 as part of the war between the two nations which formed part of the larger Seven Years' War. After the Spanish abandoned their former policy of neutrality by signing the family compact with France, Britain declared war on Spain in January 1762. The British government decided to mount an attack on the important Spanish naval base of Havana, with the intention of weakening the Spanish West Indies and improving the security of its own American colonies. A Royal Navy force consisting of squadrons from Britain and the West Indies, escorting 160 troopships, were able to approach Havana from a direction that neither Governor Juan de Prado nor Admiral Gutierre de Hevia expected and were able to trap de Hevia's fleet in the Havana harbour and land their troops with relatively little resistance.
The Spanish decided on a strategy of delaying the British attack until the strength of the city's defences and the onset of seasonal rains inflicting tropical diseases would significantly reduce the size of the attacking force via disease, along with the start of hurricane season would force the British fleet to seek a safe anchorage. However, the city's main fortress, the Morro Castle was overlooked by a hill that de Prado had neglected to fortify; the British installed batteries there and bombarded the fortress daily with heavy shelling. The fortress eventually fell after its commander Luis Vicente de Velasco was mortally wounded by a stray bullet. The capture of Morro Castle led to the eventual fall of the rest of the fortifications and the surrender of the city and its garrison before the hurricane season began.
The surrender of Havana led to substantial rewards for the British commanders and smaller amounts of prize money for other officers and men. De Prado, de Hevia and other senior Spanish officers were court-martialled upon their return to Spain and punished for their failures to conduct a better defence and allowing de Hevia's fleet to fall intact into the British hands. Havana remained under British occupation until February 1763, when it was returned to Spain under the 1763 Treaty of Paris that ended the Seven Years' War.

Background

Havana in the late 18th century was a major port and naval base, and also the strongest fortress in Spanish America. Its royal shipyard with access to abundant supplies of resistant hardwoods was capable of building first-rate ships of the line and had been developed by the Bourbon monarchy as the most important of its three naval shipyards. There had been several previous plans to attack Havana, including one proposed to Vernon in 1739, which he rejected in favour of an attack on Porto Bello, but no successful attack since it was comprehensively fortified, and the strength of its fortifications and difficulty that large sailing warships would have in making an undetected approach from the north convinced the Spanish commanders it would be virtually impossible to capture, if its fortifications were in good order and it was properly garrisoned. Its wealth and ability to feed its population also suggested that it could resist being starved into surrender.
Britain had been formally at war with France since May 1756, but Spain under Ferdinand VI remained neutral. After Ferdinand's death in 1759, his half-brother Charles III, reversed Ferdinand's policy and, by the Treaty of Paris, re-established the so-called Family Compact between France and Spain. This treaty involved an offensive alliance directed against Britain, and in December 1761, Spain placed an embargo on British trade, seized British goods in Spain and expelled British merchants. In response to this, Britain declared war on Spain in January 1762.

Spanish preparations

Before involving his country in the conflict raging in Europe and across the world, Charles III made provisions to defend the Spanish colonies against the Royal Navy. For the defence of Cuba, he appointed Juan de Prado as Captain General of Cuba, which was an administrative rather than a military position. De Prado arrived at Havana in February 1761 and began construction efforts to improve the fortifications of the city, although the work was incomplete at the time of the siege.
In June 1761, a flotilla of seven ships of the line under the command of Admiral Gutierre de Hevia arrived at Havana, transporting two infantry regiments of regulars totalling 996 men, bringing up the number of the Havana garrison to 2,400 regulars. There were also 6,300 sailors and marines aboard the ships. However, yellow fever had reduced the effective defending forces of the city by the time the siege began to 1,900 regulars, 750 marines, around 5,000 sailors and 2,000 to 3,000 militia, besides several thousand more without muskets or training to operate them. The main garrison consisted of:
  • España Infantry Regiment
  • Aragón Infantry Regiment
  • Havana Infantry Regiment
  • Edinburgh's Dragoons
  • Army gunners
  • Navy gunners and marines
Havana had one of the finest natural harbours in the West Indies with a 180 m wide and 800 m long entrance channel giving access to the harbour. Two strong fortresses defended the entrance channel. On the north side of the channel stood the very strong Castillo de los Tres Reyes del Morro on the rocky Cavannos Ridge. It had 64 artillery pieces and was garrisoned by 700 men. However, it had been noted that most of its guns faced Havana's port and bay, and that it was overlooked by the unfortified hill of La Cabaña. Although it had been proposed to fortify La Cabaña, the project had been delayed and no guns had been installed there by the start of the siege. The south side was defended by the older Castillo de San Salvador de la Punta. The channel could also be blocked by a boom chain extending from El Morro to La Punta. Havana itself lay on the south side along the channel and was surrounded by a wall long.

British preparations

Two days after the declaration of war with Spain, on the advice of Lord Anson, the British cabinet chose Havana as a major objective in its attack on Spain because of its strategic importance, believing that its permanent loss would weaken Spanish influence in the Caribbean. Detailed plans were made for a combined naval and military attack on Havana, relying on the Royal Navy's superiority in numbers and effectiveness over the Spanish fleet. Admiral Sir George Pocock, with seven ships-of-the-line and a frigate and Commodore Keppel his second-in-command, was to transport a military force under the command of George Keppel, 3rd Earl of Albemarle to the West Indies, to join the West Indies naval squadron, then under the command of Rear-Admiral Rodney, who was undertaking operations against Martinique, taking on additional troops there. The fleet was then to proceed to the northwest of Saint-Domingue to embark 4,000 men from the British colonies in North America, commanded by Jeffrey Amherst, and be further reinforced by a squadron from Port Royal, Jamaica, commanded by Sir James Douglas. It was to keep its final destination in doubt until it launched its amphibious attack on Havana.
These plans were modified to meet circumstances, as Rodney and Robert Monckton commanding the troops had captured Martinique before Pocock sailed, 3,000 British and American troops from New York did not arrive at Havana until late July, and the plan to take up to 2,000 slaves from Jamaica to act as pioneers only produced 600 slaves, as many owners were reluctant to part with them without a scheme for compensation. A plan by Amherst to assemble a force of 8,000 men for an attack on Louisiana was dismissed by Albemarle as impractical as it would have left too few troops in the North American colonies.
During the month of February, British troops embarked; they consisted of:
On 5 March the British expedition sailed from Spithead, England, with 7 ships of the line and 4,365 men aboard 64 transports and shops carrying supplies and artillery. The fleet arrived in Barbados on 20 April. Five days later the expedition reached Fort Royal on the recently conquered island of Martinique where it picked up the remainder of Major-General Robert Monckton's expedition, still numbering 8,461 men. Rear Admiral Rodney's squadron, amounting to 8 ships of the line also joined the expedition bringing the total number of ships of the line to 15. There was some friction between Rodney and Pocock, as the latter had been preferred for the naval command of this important expedition. On 23 May the expedition, now off the northwest corner of Saint-Domingue, was further reinforced by Sir James Douglas' squadron from Port Royal, Jamaica. The combined force now amounted to 21 ships of the line, 24 lesser warships, and 168 other vessels, carrying some 14,000 seamen and marines plus another 3,000 hired sailors and 12,826 regulars.

Siege

The normal approach to Havana, on the north coast of Cuba, was to sail west parallel to the south coast of the island on the prevailing south-easterly wind, then to round its western tip and sail east towards Havana, against the wind. This last section, more than 200 miles long, would take a large squadron at least one week, and probably several, to complete, giving ample warning for Havana to prepare. To the north of Havana, reaching as far as the Bahamas, is a wide expanse of shallow water, reefs and small islands or cays, accessible only to small boats except for one deep water channel, the Old Bahama Channel which is only some 10 miles wide at its narrowest. Although the Spanish navigators that charted it thought too dangerous for large warships, it was surveyed by a British frigate, whose captain left parties of his men in the cays to mark the extremities of the channel, allowing the whole fleet to pass through it, safely and undetected.
On 6 June the British force came into sight of Havana. Immediately, 12 British ships of the line were sent to the mouth of the entrance channel to block in the Spanish fleet. After surveying the city's defences, the British planned to begin the operations with the reduction of the Morro fortress, on the north side of the channel, through a formal Vauban-style siege. The commanding position of this fort over the city would then force the Spanish commander to surrender. However, the initial survey had underestimated the strength of the Morro fortress, which was located on a rocky promontory where it was impossible to dig approach trenches and that a large ditch cut into the rock protected the fort on the land side.
Although Prado had received information of the presence of British ships two days before its arrival from a frigate that had escaped from the port of Matanzas, he did not believe that major warships could navigate the Old Bahama Channel. Prado and Admiral Hevia, surprised by the size of the attacking force, adopted a delaying defensive strategy. Prado wrote to the French in Saint-Domingue and to Spain for relief forces to be sent. He also requested reinforcements from Santiago de Cuba, which had the second strongest military force on the island, and although two relief forces set out from the Oriente Province in July, both were delayed by food shortages and high levels of sickness. One turned back and the other was still one day's march from Havana when the city surrendered. Besides hope of a relief force, Prado and the Havana garrison had several advantages. Firstly, the hurricane season would begin in late August, putting the British fleet in danger: the wet weather starting earlier in that month would probably also initiate an outbreak of yellow fever among the besiegers. Secondly, despite some losses from tropical diseases Prado had 1,500 Spanish regular soldiers and some 2,300 colonial militiamen, as well as sailors from the fleet.
There were initially 12 Spanish ships of the line in the harbour, besides two others newly constructed but not manned, and also several smaller warships and around 100 merchant ships. The presence of so many merchant ships dissuaded the council from ordering the Spanish fleet to disrupt the British landings, which was also in accordance with the instructions that Admiral Hevia had received when he left Spain to protect Cuba's commerce The fleet's gunners and marines were sent to garrison the fortresses of Morro and Punta which were placed under the command of naval officers. Most of the shot and powder of the fleet as well as its best guns were also transferred to these two fortresses. Meanwhile, regular troops were assigned to the defence of the city. Prado also ordered all women, children and the old and infirm to leave the city, leaving only men able to bear arms.
The channel entrance was immediately closed with the boom chain. Additionally, three ships of the line, Europa and Neptuno ) were selected on account of their poor condition and sunk behind the boom chain. Although this made the remaining Spanish warships unable to leave the harbour, they were clearly outnumbered by the British fleet, and this move made the sailors available to defend the city. Realising the importance of the Morro, the Spanish commanders gave it top priority.
The following day British troops were landed northeast of Havana, and began advancing west the next day. They met a militia party that was easily pushed back. By the end of the day, British infantry had reached the vicinity of Havana. The defence of the Morro was assigned to Luis Vicente de Velasco e Isla, a naval officer, who immediately took measures to prepare and provision the fortress for a siege.