Action on the Polderhoek Spur


The Action on the Polderhoek Spur, was a local operation in the Ypres Salient, by the British Fourth Army against the German 4th Army during the Third Battle of Ypres in Belgium during the First World War. Two battalions of the 2nd New Zealand Brigade of the New Zealand Division attacked the low ridge from which German observers could view the ground from Cameron Covert to the north and the Menin road to the south-west. A New Zealand advance of on a front, would shield the area north of the Reutelbeek stream from German observers on the Gheluvelt spur further south.
Heavy artillery bombarded the ruins of Polderhoek Château and the pillboxes in the grounds on as howitzers fired a wire cutting bombardment. The attack on 3 December was made in daylight, as a ruse, in the hope that the unusual time would surprise the German defenders, who would be under cover sheltering from the bombardments being fired at the same time each day. The British planned smoke and gas bombardments on the Gheluvelt and Becelaere spurs on the flanks and the infantry attack began at the same time as the "routine" bombardment.
The ruse failed; some of the British artillery-fire dropped short on the New Zealanders and the Germans engaged the attackers with small-arms fire from Polderhoek Spur and Gheluvelt ridge. A strong west wind ruined the smoke screens and the British artillery failed to suppress the German machine-guns, which forced the attackers under cover. New Zealand machine-gunners then repulsed a counter-attack by German parties advancing along the Becelaere road. The New Zealanders were short of the first objective but another attempt after dark was cancelled because of the full moon and sight of German reinforcements reaching Polderhoek Château.
On 4 December, German troops assembling for another counter-attack were dispersed by British artillery-fire and German artillery bombarded the captured area all day. The New Zealanders consolidated the new trench line during the night and defeated a German counter-attack at dawn on 5 December. The New Zealanders handed over to IX Corps and went into reserve as the Germans used an observation balloon, accurately to direct the German guns. A German attack later in the day was stopped by artillery-fire but on 14 December, the ground was re-captured by a German counter-attack.

Background

Strategic developments

Rain had caused the British temporarily to postpone attacks after the offensive began with the Battle of Pilckem Ridge on 31 July but in August the water had dried relatively quickly. In October the rains soaked the ground again and did not dry in sunny spells. Carrying parties were needed to move supplies to the front line and conditions for the artillery became so bad that pack mules were brought in to carry ammunition. Heavy artillery had to be strung out in lines along the plank roads, which made them easily visible to German artillery observers.
Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, the commander of the British Expeditionary Force was kept informed of conditions and the levels of sickness in the armies in Flanders and judged accurately that conditions for German troops were worse. Haig abandoned the strategic objectives of the offensive in early October but ordered that once the weather had improved, Passchendaele Ridge was to be captured as a suitable winter position. On 21 October, the 4th Army reported that its troops would not be able to continue to resist for much longer, under the constant British artillery-fire and being exposed to the weather in mud-filled shell-holes, with no time for recover because of the tempo of British attacks.

British tactics, late 1917

After the Battle of the Menin Road Ridge on 20 September, British attack planning had reached a stage of development where plans had been reduced to a formula; on 7 November, the Second Army operation order for the next attack was written on less than a sheet of paper. Corps staffs produced more detailed plans, particularly for the artillery and greater discretion granted to divisional commanders than in 1915 and 1916. The tactical sophistication of the infantry had increased during the battle but the chronic difficulty of communication between front and rear during an attack could only partially be remedied by expedients that relied on observation, which was dependent on good visibility. Due to the German system of pillbox defence and the impossibility of maintaining line formations on ground full of flooded shell-craters, waves of infantry had been replaced by a thin line of skirmishers leading small columns, which snaked around shell-holes and mud sloughs. The rifle was re-established as the primary infantry weapon and Stokes mortars were added to creeping barrages; "draw net" barrages were introduced, where field guns began a barrage behind the German front line and then moved it towards the German positions several times before an attack.

German tactics

German counter-attacks from the Battle of the Menin Road Ridge on 20 September to the end of the Flanders campaign, were "assaults on reinforced field positions", due to the British infantry making shorter advances after the torrential rains of August turned the ground into a swamp. The British difficulty in co-ordinating infantry advances, artillery-fire, tank and aircraft operations in such weather, left the British infantry vulnerable to the German defensive tactic of Gegenstöße. The good weather in early September greatly increased the effectiveness of British air observation and artillery-fire and on 20 September, the Battle of Polygon Wood and the Battle of Broodseinde, German counter-attacks had been smashed. On 9 October, the 4th Army dispersed the battalions of front line regiments again and moved reserve battalions back behind the artillery protective line. Eingreifdivisionen were moved closer to the front line quickly to counter-attack and counter-battery fire was increased to protect the Eingreifdivisionen from the British artillery.
Behind a Vorfeldlinie, an outpost zone deep, was occupied by a few sentries and machine-guns. When the British attacked, the sentries were swiftly to retire across the outpost zone to the main line of resistance and the artillery was quickly to bombard the Vorfeldlinie. The rear battalions of the Stellungsdivisionen and its Eingreifdivision would advance to the Hauptwiederstandslinie and conduct a Gegenstoß or a Gegenangriff after to prepare. The length of front held by a Stellungsdivision was reduced by half to with a depth of, because of the difficulties caused by the weather, devastating British artillery-fire and German infantry casualties. Infantry battalions were relieved after two days and the divisions every six days. The revised defensive system helped the German infantry retain the north end of Passchendaele Ridge but by mid-November, the 4th Army had been reduced to hanging on until winter ended the battle.

Prelude

Polderhoek Spur

October–November

DateRain
mm		Temp
°F
10.251dull
20.756dull
30.052dull
40.047dull
50.049fog
61.052dull
71.448dull
82.644dull
91.650dull
1013.446—
111.848—
12——fine
13——fine
14——rain
15——fine
16——dull
17——dull
18——dull
19——dull
20——dull
21——rain
22——rain
23——rain
24——rain
25——rain
26——snow
27——rain
28——fine
29——fine
30——fine
1——fine
2——cold
3——fine
4——cold
5——fine

A brigade of the 5th Division attacked on 4 October between the Scherriabeek and Reutelbeek towards Polderhoek Spur and the château, against the German 19th Reserve Division. The brigade captured pillboxes in the château grounds and parties got into the château but German troops conducted eight Gegenstöße and recaptured the spur. At on 9 October, the 5th Division attacked again with a fresh brigade, reached the château ruins and attacked the pill-boxes nearby but mud clogged many weapons. Machine-gun fire from Gheluvelt forced the British back to the start line and a night attack was cancelled. The British commander attributed the defeat to the failure to bombard or attack Gheluvelt.
At on 26 October, another 5th Division brigade attacked the spur, the 7th Division attacking Gheluvelt on the right. The 7th Division was held up by mud and the right hand battalion of the 5th Division attack found the Scherriabeek valley a mud slough; rifles and machine-guns were clogged and the attackers were raked by fire from Gheluvelt. The centre battalion reached the château and captured a German battalion headquarters, and many machine-guns but with rifles out of action and exposed in a salient, the battalion was too vulnerable to a counter-attack and withdrew level with the flanking battalions.
By dark the British were back on the start line and the German artillery deluged the forward British positions and batteries, tracks and roads east of Ypres and hit railheads, dumps and camps west of the city with long-range guns. The Germans fired area bombardments every day at intervals behind the British front but it was soon possible to predict the targets and avoid the worst spots. German shells sank into the mud before exploding, which threw up mud spouts with little explosive effect. British shells fitted with the instantaneous No. 106 Fuze worked better but still with limited effect.
On 6 November, the last fresh brigade of the 5th Division attacked the spur at after the divisional artillery had been reinforced to one 18-pounder for every of front, some firing shrapnel and some with HE shells fitted with Fuze 106. Heavy artillery bombarded the German pillboxes with HE shells but the pillboxes were so small that few were hit. As the British infantry advanced behind the creeping barrage, they were caught by German machine-gun fire; confused fighting began in the château grounds and the British got within of the ruins. By nightfall a blockhouse in the south-west corner of the grounds had been captured and several German counter-attacks repulsed.