Operation Popeye (Brazil)
Operation Popeye was the advance of the Tiradentes and Caicó detachments of the Brazilian Army and the Military Police of Minas Gerais, from Minas Gerais, to Rio de Janeiro and Brasília during the 1964 Brazilian coup d'état. Their rearguard was protected within Minas Gerais by operations Cage and Silence. Ordered by general Olímpio Mourão Filho, from the 4th Military Region/Infantry Division, it was the coup's first military offensive. The Tiradentes Detachment, whose command was given to general Antônio Carlos Muricy, faced loyalist forces from the 1st Army in Rio de Janeiro's territory, under the command of general Luís Tavares da Cunha Melo, from 31 March 1964. The operation was one of the factors behind president João Goulart's departure from Rio de Janeiro and the collapse of loyalist resistance in the city; when the detachments entered Guanabara and Brasília on 2 April, the federal government had already been defeated.
Since 1963, Mourão Filho had been conspiring in Minas Gerais against the federal government, allied to his subordinate, general Carlos Luís Guedes, governor Magalhães Pinto and the PMMG, which was prepared to fight as a conventional force. Guedes and Magalhães Pinto had a more defensive plan, reinforced by negotiations with Espírito Santo for access to the sea, from where they could receive American logistical support. Mourão deemed this to be impractical, as the Minas Gerais garrison was much weaker than that of Rio de Janeiro. His solution was a surprise attack, gathering units from Juiz de Fora at night, entering Guanabara at dawn, arresting the president and taking over the Ministry of War. This was what the operation consisted of, but the original plan was never used, as Mourão launched the coup in the early hours of 31 March. What happened next was the gathering of the rebel forces and their meeting with the loyalists in the interior of Rio de Janeiro over the course of two days.
The operation took place along the Union and Industry highway, with the most important events in the stretch between the Paraibuna river, on Minas Gerais' border with Rio de Janeiro, and the city of Areal. The forces of the loyalist "military apparatus" had a full numerical and firepower advantage, and their victory was likely when only considering the military dimension. Its orders were defensive, and Goulart did not want to use the Air Force, which could have been decisive. Muricy was counting on the political dimension for support. On 31 March, before the arrival of the loyalists, the rebels already had a bridgehead over the Paraibuna, in the town of Monte Serrat. At night they were confronted by forces from the 1st Battalion of Caçadores, coming from Petrópolis, under lieutenant colonel Kerensky Túlio Motta. Kerensky was forced to retreat after two of his platoons joined the rebels around midnight. Then, at 05:00, the powerful 1st Infantry Regiment, which was supposed to mount a defense on the Paraíba do Sul river, in Três Rios, joined the Tiradentes Detachment. Três Rios, unprotected, was taken at 10:30. Cunha Melo commanded the last line of defense, the 2nd RI, ahead of Areal. The fight approached on the afternoon of 1 April, but the possibility of confrontation was interrupted by news that Cunha Melo's superior, Armando de Moraes Âncora, commander of the 1st Army, would negotiate in Resende. Cunha Melo negotiated with Muricy, ceasing resistance and allowing his passage to Rio de Janeiro.
The operation took place in parallel with the 2nd Army's participation in the coup, which advanced against the 1st Army in the Paraíba Valley, and the events in Rio de Janeiro, together leading to the president's departure and loss of authority in Southeastern Brazil. This occurred while the Tiradentes Detachment was still in the interior of Rio de Janeiro, and the Ministry of War was taken over by general Costa e Silva before Mourão's arrival in Rio de Janeiro, frustrating his ambitions. The confrontation between the opposing forces, who were on the ground in combat positions but did not actually fight, was feared by local residents and reported in the press at the time as the scene of a hypothetical civil war.
Background
Protagonists of the Minas Gerais conspiracy
In May 1962, the Institute for Research and Social Studies, an organization committed to uniting opposition social sectors and weakening João Goulart's government, set up in Belo Horizonte, expanding beyond the Rio-São Paulo axis to Minas Gerais, another politically and economically relevant state. Meetings became frequent from July 1963 onwards. The IPES-MG board was made up only of businessmen, but the rest of the organization had "industrialists, intellectuals, journalists, academics, military officers, among others", including members of middle class. Among the army there were several "traditionalist" officers, that is, untrained by the Superior War School and unaligned with the capitalist reorganization project defended by the IPES-IBAD -ESG complex. However, they agreed in their opposition to the government. Colonel Dióscoro do Vale, commander of the 12th Infantry Regiment, was a representative of this group. Colonel José Geraldo de Oliveira, commander of the Polícia Militar de Minas Gerais, was also a member of IPES-MG.IPES-MG initially struggled to influence the officer corps. Their preferred high-ranking commander came to be brigade general Carlos Luís Guedes, sworn in as commander of the Divisional Infantry of the 4th Infantry Division in December 1961. Guedes was enticed through his General Staff, his contacts with civilians from IPES-MG and military contacts between the São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro IPES units and ID/4's command in Belo Horizonte. This was not ideal, as despite being a radical opponent of the president, Guedes did not share an ideology with the IPES/ESG group, but he was the available option. In January 1964, at the "Acaiaca Meeting", attended by Aluísio Aragão Villar, leader of IPES-MG, businessmen confirmed their material support for a coup and Guedes was designated the military leader of the conspiracy.
Hierarchically, Guedes, at the head of a Divisional Infantry, was not the highest authority in Minas Gerais, only commanded infantry units and was subordinate to a divisional command. In this case, it was the 4th Infantry Division, based in Juiz de Fora, whose command was merged with that of the 4th Military Region and thus, also known as the 4th RM/DI. This hybrid situation existed in regions far from the border and of lower priority, that is, Juiz de Fora, Curitiba and Recife, in the 4th, 5th and 7th RM/DIs. The 4th RM/DI was subordinate to the 1st Army, in Rio de Janeiro.
In August 1963, Olímpio Mourão Filho, a "long-time conspirator and already known in Brazilian political and military circles", took over as Guedes' superior in the 4th RM/DI. By then he had already conspired against Goulart in the 3rd DI, in Santa Maria, Rio Grande do Sul, and in the 2nd RM, in São Paulo. Politically he was one of the "traditionalists". In São Paulo he had already drawn up plans equivalent to the Popeye, Cage and Silence operations he'd order in Minas Gerais.
As soon as he arrived, Mourão met with Guedes and governor José de Magalhães Pinto in September, explaining his intention to launch a "revolution" against the federal government. Both accepted the plan and Magalhães and Mourão respectively assumed civilian and military leadership of the conspiracy. Mourão's leadership was relative, as IPES-MG did not trust him, fearing his impetuosity, which could put the carefully planned conspiracy at risk. Furthermore, Mourão could get closer to governor Magalhães and general Costa e Silva, who diverged from the interests of the IPES/ESG group. Thus, Guedes acted to control him, interfering in his actions. Mourão realized this and felt hampered, believing that Guedes was hindering the "revolution". Mourão and Guedes hated each other. What IPES valued in Mourão was his value as "bait", attracting the attention of the federal government's intelligence service, and his anti-government agitation within the military. At the time, there was little conspiratorial mobilization among the military in Minas Gerais, although the social environment was suitable for its expansion.
Guedes stood on one pole of the conspiracy, and on the other, Magalhães and Mourão. The governor sought not the "class political agenda" of IPES, but his personal political ambitions, aiming to become president in the election scheduled for 1965. Mourão's military strength would be an asset that he could use in his power maneuvers. For Mourão, the governor's support conferred political legitimacy. The governor also controlled the state's Military Police, which was important for the balance of military strength, as will be seen later.
Minas Gerais' strengths and weaknesses
Minas Gerais was a convenient state for launching the coup due to the high cohesion between the generals and the governor, guaranteeing the desired civilian political support. This cohesion extended to the Military Police and the Air Force. Mourão Filho, as the highest military authority in the state, found it simpler to conspire; in São Paulo, the 2nd Military Region and 2nd Infantry Division were separate commands, and Rio Grande do Sul was host to the 3rd Military Region and five different divisions, which required coordination between several generals. Minas Gerais' central position allowed communication with any region of the country, and there was a complete road network. Thus, offensively, Brasília and Rio de Janeiro were within reach — the latter was close to the HQ in Juiz de Fora, unlike São Paulo, 430 kilometers away, and Santa Maria, 1,600. Defensively, its mountainous terrain would be an advantage in armed resistance. In the event of a prolonged conflict, food supply was guaranteed by livestock farming in the north and agriculture in the south of the state.Nevertheless, the federal government did not fear Guedes and Mourão. It knew that they were not reliable, but their combined strength was less than a fully trained regiment. The territory of Minas Gerais was home to only a tiny number of Armed Forces servicemen, especially the army, estimated at 4,000 men. Army statistics predicted for 1964 the service of 5,091 soldiers in the 4th DI and 1,741 in the 4th RM, out of a total of 48,965 in the 1st Army, the remainder of which were in Rio de Janeiro. The few soldiers available consisted basically of reservists, with incomplete training of only three to four months a year. The local garrison was a bottom priority for materiel distribution: Minas Gerais was far from military dangers and, for the Brazilian Army, it was not a priority. The 4th RM/DI was used only as a source of resources, and its military commands were logistical, not operational.
Mourão Filho, discussing the weakness of the garrison, noted that:
| Brazilian Army forces in Minas Gerais |
4th Military Region/Infantry Division, Juiz de Fora
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Another weakness was that Minas Gerais is a landlocked state, which prevented, in the case of a defensive war, the arrival of supplies from the sea; this was resolved through Espírito Santo.