North Korean defectors


People defect from North Korea for political, material, safety and personal reasons. Defectors flee to various countries, mainly South Korea. In South Korea, they are referred to by several terms, including "northern refugees" and "new settlers".
Towards the end of the North Korean famine of the 1990s, there was a steep increase in defections, reaching a peak in 1998 and 1999. Since then, some of the main reasons for the falling number of defectors have been strict border patrols and inspections, forced deportations, the costs of defection, and the end of the mass famine that swept the country when Soviet aid ceased with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The most common strategy for defectors is to cross the China–North Korea border into the Chinese provinces of Jilin or Liaoning. About 76% to 84% of defectors interviewed in China or South Korea came from the North Korean provinces bordering China.
From China, defectors usually flee to a third country, due to China being a relatively close ally of North Korea. China is the most influential of North Korea's few economic partners, with the latter's situation as the target of decades of UN sanctions. China is also a continuous source of aid to North Korea. To avoid worsening the already tense relations with the Korean Peninsula, China refuses to grant North Korean defectors refugee status and considers them illegal economic migrants. Defectors caught in China are repatriated back to North Korea, where human rights groups say they often face torture, wrongful imprisonment, sexual violence, forced labor, and possible execution.

Terms

Different terms, official and unofficial, refer to North Korean refugees. One such term in South Korea is "northern refugees".
On 9 January 2005, the South Korean Ministry of Unification announced the use of instead of , a term about which North Korean officials expressed displeasure. A newer term is , which has the more forceful meaning of "residents who renounced North Korea".
The expert in North Korea Andrei Lankov has criticized the term "defectors", as most who flee North Korea are not political dissidents seeking asylum, but are instead primarily motivated by a desire to escape poverty.
In 2025, the South Korean government considered using the new expression bukhyangmin, meaning people whose hometowns are in the north, as the previous designation talbukmin was considered to have negative connotations. However, due to the difference in a homophonic Hanja, this expression could also be misinterpreted as people heading northward, i.e., someone who identifies with North Korean ideology..

Settlement process

North Korean defectors must first enter the North Korean Refugee Protection Center, run by the National Intelligence Service, for interrogation for about 90 days when they leave North Korea and enter South Korea. The interrogation process is conducted in conjunction with the National Intelligence Service, the Ministry of Unification, the National Police Agency, and the Committee for the Five Northern Korean Provinces, necessary to check whether they are spies sent by the North Korean regime or ethnic Koreans disguised as North Korean defectors. Only if North Korean defectors pass the interrogation successfully will they be admitted to Hanawon operated by the Ministry of Unification and trained to adapt to South Korean society.

Demographics

According to Courtland Robinson, assistant professor at the Center for Refugee and Disaster Response at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, around 10,000 North Korean defectors are staying in China. 1,418 were registered as arriving in South Korea in 2016. In 2017, there were 31,093 defectors registered with the Unification Ministry in South Korea, 71% of whom were women. In 2018, the numbers had been dramatically dropping since Kim Jong Un took power in 2011, trending towards less than a thousand per year, down from the peak of 2,914 in 2009.
Robinson estimated that in the past the total number of 6,824 and 7,829 children were born to North Korean women in the three Northeastern Provinces of China. Recently, survey results conducted in 2013 by Johns Hopkins and the Korea Institute for National Unification showed that there were about 8,708 North Korean defectors and 15,675 North Korean children in China's same three Northeastern Provinces which are Jilin, Liaoning and Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture.
Most North Korean refugees reportedly leave the country due to economic reasons. Based on a study of North Korean defectors, women make up the majority of defections. In 2002, they comprised 56% of defections to South Korea, and by 2011, the number had grown to 71%. More women leave the North because they are more likely to suffer financial hardships. This is due to the prevalence of women in service sector jobs whereas men are employed in the military. According to South Korean government data, 45% of defectors cited economic reasons for defecting. According to NK News, men had a higher tendency to leave the country due to political, ideological or surveillance pressure. During the first half of 2018, 88% of defectors to the South were women.

Migration

Paths of migration

For most North Koreans, there are no safe options for leaving the country. Regardless of which path is taken, United States special envoy for North Korean Human Rights Issues Robert R. King asserts that there is danger and risk associated with tremendous repercussions for being caught. The border to the south, shared with South Korea, is heavily guarded and militarized with constant lookouts, millions of landmines, and thousands of soldiers on both sides of the border itself. The 10-mile northern border shared with Russia is also constantly patrolled and the Russian soldiers immediately turn any defectors over to the North Korean government. Leaving by water is just as difficult with the guards along the coasts, limited access to boats, and sea patrols to catch anyone who may get through the first defense measures. The only other option is through the Chinese border. In comparison it is safe, but it is still very risky and difficult.

Effects of COVID-19

The COVID-19 pandemic caused the North Korean-Chinese border to be significantly more closed and difficult to pass through. This has caused refugees entering South Korea to significantly drop. This gives an idea of why migration of North Koreans to the States has slowed significantly, along with the factors previously discussed.

Gender in migration

There is a disproportionate number of women who escape North Korea due to human trafficking across the North Korean-Chinese border. A 2020 study found that due to food shortages in North Korea, women have been going further out to obtain food. "The moment they cross the border — and sometimes when they are still in North Korea — refugee women are tapped by marriage brokers and pimps involved in human trafficking." The preference for male babies in China, especially in rural areas, led to a disproportionate number of males, leading to a need for more marriage-age women. These women are trafficked across the border and sold to Chinese men in these rural areas to satisfy this need. This, however, has caused significant mental health issues for these refugees and often prevents them from escaping to safer areas.

By destination

South Korea

South Korea's Ministry of Unification is a government organization that is in charge of preparing for a future reunification between North and South Korea. It is responsible for north–south relations including economic trade, diplomacy, and communication, and education of reunification, which involves spreading awareness in schools and among the public sphere. The Ministry of Unification is thus the main organization that manages North Korean defectors in South Korean territory by establishing admission processes and resettlement policies. It also has regional sub-organs called Hana Centers that help defectors in their day-to-day life for a more smooth transition into South Korean society. The number of defectors since the 1950–1953 Korean War is more than 26,000. Military defections across the heavily fortified demilitarized zone are few in number, with only 20 defectors since 1996.
Under the South Korean Constitution, North Korea is viewed as an illegal occupier of the Korean peninsula. As such, under South Korean law, all North Koreans are citizens of the Republic of Korea, so they are granted citizenship status almost immediately upon entering the country. This causes issues for North Korean refugees hoping to gain refugee or asylum status in the United States. Their citizenship status in South Korea blocked them from receiving immigration status, until 2004 in the United States, because they were considered to be resettled and no longer qualified for refugee status.

Reward

In 1962, the government of South Korea introduced the "Special law on the protection of defectors from the North" which, after revision in 1978, remained effective until 1993. According to the law, every defector was eligible for an aid package. After their arrival in the South, defectors would receive an allowance. The size of this allowance depended on which of three categories the particular defector belonged. The category was determined by the defector's political and intelligence value. Apart from this allowance, defectors who delivered especially valuable intelligence or equipment were given large additional rewards. Prior to 1997 the payments had been fixed in gold bullion, not in South Korean won—in attempts to counter ingrained distrust about the reliability of paper money.
In 2004, South Korea passed controversial new measures intended to slow the flow of asylum seekers because of concern that a growing number of North Koreans crossing the Amnok and Duman rivers into China would soon seek refuge in the South.
The regulations tighten defector screening processes and slash the amount of money given to each refugee from ₩28,000,000 to ₩10,000,000. South Korean officials say the new rules are intended to prevent ethnic Koreans living in China from entering the South, as well as to stop North Koreans with criminal records from gaining entry.
As of 2006, the state provided some defectors with apartments, and all those who wished to study were granted the right to enter a university of their choice. For a period of time after their arrival, defectors were also provided with personal bodyguards.
By 2015, the South Korean government paid interview fees to defectors ranging from $50 to $500 per hour depending on the quality of the information provided.
In 2016, defectors past retirement age received Basic Livelihood Benefits of about ₩450,000 per month, which covered basic necessities, but left them amongst the poorest of retirees.
In 2017, the South Korean government increased to $860,000 the reward it pays to defectors who provide information that helps South Korean security interests. Those who defect with weapons are entitled to other amounts.
In 2021, the Ministry of Unification described the support package for defectors as:
  • 12 weeks of adaptation training
  • $6,000 to $32,400 of settlement benefits, depending on size of household
  • $13,300 to $19,100 housing subsidy
  • Free education in public schools and universities