Negative utilitarianism
Negative utilitarianism is a form of negative consequentialism that can be described as the view that people should minimize the total amount of aggregate suffering, or that they should minimize suffering and then, secondarily, maximize the total amount of happiness. It can be regarded as a version of utilitarianism that gives greater priority to reducing suffering than to increasing pleasure. This differs from classical utilitarianism, which does not claim that reducing suffering is intrinsically more important than increasing happiness. Both versions of utilitarianism, however, hold that whether an action is morally right or wrong depends solely on whether it promotes or decreases net well-being. Such well-being consists of both positive and negative aspects, that is, it is the sum of what is good and what is bad for individuals.
Negative utilitarianism would thus differ from other consequentialist views, such as negative prioritarianism or negative egalitarianism. While these other theories would also support minimizing suffering, they would give special weight to reducing the suffering of those who are worse off.
The term "negative utilitarianism" is used by some authors to denote the theory that reducing negative well-being is the only thing that ultimately matters morally. Others distinguish between "strong" and "weak" versions of negative utilitarianism, where strong versions are only concerned with reducing negative well-being, and weak versions say that both positive and negative well-being matter but that negative well-being matters more.
Other versions of negative utilitarianism differ in how much weight they give to negative well-being compared to positive well-being, as well as the different conceptions of what well-being is. For example, negative preference utilitarianism says that the well-being in an outcome depends on frustrated preferences. Negative hedonistic utilitarianism thinks of well-being in terms of pleasant and unpleasant experiences. There are many other variations on how negative utilitarianism can be specified.
The term "negative utilitarianism" was introduced by R. Ninian Smart in 1958 in his reply to Karl Popper's The Open Society and Its Enemies. Smart also presented the most famous argument against negative utilitarianism: that negative utilitarianism would entail that a ruler who is able to instantly and painlessly destroy the human race would have a duty to do so. Furthermore, every human being would have a moral responsibility to commit suicide, thereby preventing future suffering. Many authors have endorsed the rationale behind these arguments against negative utilitarianism.
History
The term "negative utilitarianism" was introduced by R. N. Smart in his 1958 reply to Karl Popper's book The Open Society and Its Enemies, published in 1945. In the book, Popper emphasizes the importance of preventing suffering in public policy. The ideas in negative utilitarianism have similarities with ancient traditions such as Jainism and Buddhism. Ancient Greek philosopher Hegesias of Cyrene has been said to be "one of the earliest exponents of NU ." In more recent times, ideas similar to negative utilitarianism can be found in the works of 19th century psychologist Edmund Gurney who wrote:Discussions and writings about negative utilitarianism have become increasingly common, particularly in recent decades. While the term was relatively rare before the late 20th century, it has experienced a significant surge in usage since then. This could be attributed to various factors, such as the rise of movements focused on global suffering and the increasing accessibility of information.
Present figures include David Pearce, a leading advocate of negative utilitarianism who has extensively explored its implications for future technological and ethical advancements. In his work The Hedonistic Imperative, Pearce argues for the use of biotechnology to eradicate suffering in all sentient beings.
Versions
Like other kinds of utilitarianism, negative utilitarianism can take many forms depending on what specific claims are taken to constitute the theory. For example, negative preference utilitarianism says that the utility of an outcome depends on frustrated preferences. Negative hedonistic utilitarianism thinks of utility in terms of hedonic mental states such as suffering and unpleasantness. Negative Average Preference Utilitarianism makes the same assumptions on what is good as negative preference utilitarianism, but states that the average number of preferences frustrated should be minimized. Versions of utilitarianism can also differ based on whether the actual or expected consequences matter, and whether the aim is stated in terms of the average outcome among individuals or the total net utility among them. Negative utilitarianism can aim either to optimize the value of the outcome or it can be a satisficing negative utilitarianism, according to which an action ought to be taken if and only if the outcome would be sufficiently valuable. A key way in which negative utilitarian views can differ from one another is with respect to how much weight they give to negative well-being compared to positive well-being. This is a key area of variation because the key difference between negative utilitarianism and non-negative kinds of utilitarianism is that negative utilitarianism gives more weight to negative well-being.The weight of evil (disutility)
Philosophers Gustaf Arrhenius and Krister Bykvist develop a taxonomy of negative utilitarian views based on how the views weigh disutility against positive utility. In total, they distinguish among 16 kinds of negative utilitarianism. They first distinguish between strong negativism and weak negativism. Strong negativism "give all weight to disutility" and weak negativism "give some weight to positive utility, but more weight to disutility." The most commonly discussed subtypes are probably two versions of weak negative utilitarianism called "lexical" and "lexical threshold" negative utilitarianism. According to "lexical" negative utilitarianism, positive utility gets weight only when outcomes are equal with respect to disutility. That is, positive utility functions as a tiebreaker in that it determines which outcome is better when the outcomes considered have equal disutility. "Lexical threshold" negative utilitarianism says that there is some disutility, for instance some extreme suffering, such that no positive utility can counterbalance it. 'Consent-based' negative utilitarianism is a specification of lexical threshold negative utilitarianism, which specifies where the threshold should be located. It says that if an individual is suffering and would at that moment not "agree to continue the suffering in order to obtain something else in the future" then the suffering cannot be outweighed by any happiness.Other distinctions among versions of negative utilitarianism
proposes the "principle of negative utilitarianism", which is the broad idea that suffering should be minimized when possible. Mario Bunge writes about negative utilitarianism in his Treatise on Basic Philosophy but in a different sense than most others. In Bunge's sense, negative utilitarianism is about not harming. In contrast, most other discussion of negative utilitarianism takes it to imply a duty both not to harm and to help.Tranquilist axiology, closely related to negative utilitarianism, states that "an individual experiential moment is as good as it can be for her if and only if she has no craving for change." According to tranquilism, happiness and pleasure have no intrinsic value, only instrumental value. From this perspective, positive experiences superficially appear to have intrinsic value because these experiences substitute for, distract from, or relieve suffering or dissatisfaction that an agent would have otherwise faced in the absence of such experiences.