Crime in Georgia (country)
Crime in Georgia has a long and complex history, deeply rooted in the Soviet period, when the republic was a center of the shadow economy and home to a disproportionate number of influential "thieves-in-law". The country's law enforcement is primarily handled by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia.
The post-Soviet transition in the 1990s was marked by civil conflict and state weakness, allowing organized crime to merge with political and economic elites. The 2003 Rose Revolution ushered in a period of radical reforms under President Mikheil Saakashvili, characterized by a "zero-tolerance" policy towards crime and corruption. This approach included a mass dismissal of approximately 16,000 police officers but also led to a dramatic surge in the country's prison population, which peaked at over 24,000 inmates by 2011, one of the highest rates in Europe.
Following a change in government in 2012, Georgia's approach shifted significantly. A large-scale amnesty in 2013 resulted in the prison population being more than halved, marking a move away from the previous administration's punitive policies. Contemporary crime in Georgia is dominated by property crimes and drug-related offenses, which are often linked to social and economic factors such as poverty and unemployment.
Despite significant progress in combating petty corruption, particularly within the patrol police, the country continues to face challenges with high-level corruption, the independence of the judiciary, and transnational crime originating from its breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Historical context
Soviet period
During the Soviet period, Georgia developed a distinct reputation for its pervasive shadow economy and deeply entrenched criminal networks. Research indicates that Georgia had the largest shadow economy relative to its official economy among all Soviet republics, a phenomenon driven by a culture of rule evasion that developed over centuries of foreign domination. This alienation from the central state fostered an environment where informal networks and illicit enterprise thrived. Activities ranged from running underground factories to farmers defying state norms by selling large quantities of sought-after citrus fruits on the black markets of Moscow and other major cities, allowing them to earn incomes far exceeding the Soviet average.This environment also nurtured a powerful criminal underworld. By the end of the Soviet era, ethnic Georgians constituted nearly a third of the USSR's "thieves-in-law", the elite of the professional criminal world, despite making up only 2% of the Soviet population. Traditionally, these groups adhered to a strict code that forbade any cooperation with the state. However, Georgian criminal leaders, such as Jaba Ioseliani, were among the first to diverge from this code, recognizing the economic opportunities in collaborating with corrupt Communist Party officials. This created a symbiotic relationship where criminals and the party elite jointly profited from the shadow economy, blurring the lines between the state and the underworld.
This system was underpinned by a cultural context where circumventing formal rules was often seen as a sign of resilience and cunning—a quality known in Georgian as mochaliche. This long-standing distrust of the state, combined with the criminal-political nexus forged in the late Soviet period, did not disappear with the collapse of the USSR but was instead "privatized" and intensified, laying the groundwork for the widespread state capture of the 1990s.
Post-Soviet transition and the Shevardnadze era (1990s)
The collapse of the Soviet Union plunged Georgia into a period of intense turmoil. The early 1990s were defined by the Georgian Civil War and secessionist conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which created a power vacuum and widespread lawlessness. In this environment, paramilitary groups and criminal networks flourished, effectively challenging the state's monopoly on violence. A key figure of this era was Jaba Ioseliani, a prominent thief-in-law whose paramilitary group, the Mkhedrioni, evolved into one of the most powerful armed factions in the country.After playing a central role in the ouster of President Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Ioseliani was instrumental in inviting Eduard Shevardnadze to lead the country in 1992. This cemented a criminal-political nexus that defined the decade. Under Shevardnadze's rule, Georgia experienced a profound case of state capture, where state institutions were effectively "privatized" to serve the interests of a corrupt elite and their criminal associates. Important state assets were sold off in flawed insider privatizations, while key ministries became deeply involved in illicit schemes. For instance, under Interior Minister Kakha Targamadze, the police were implicated in facilitating drug trafficking and terrorism through the Pankisi Gorge.
The consequences for the country were devastating. Georgia's economy experienced one of the worst declines of any post-Soviet state, with output falling by 70% and exports by 90% after independence. Corruption became endemic, crippling key sectors: graft in the energy industry led to constant blackouts, embezzlement in transport left infrastructure in ruins, and bribery in the education system destroyed its credibility. The unresolved conflicts turned Abkhazia and South Ossetia into "black holes" for large-scale smuggling of contraband, weapons, and narcotics, further undermining Georgia's security and sovereignty. By the early 2000s, widespread popular discontent with the pervasive corruption and the country's decay set the stage for the Rose Revolution.
Rose Revolution and "zero-tolerance" policy (2003–2012)
The widespread public discontent with corruption and state decay culminated in the November 2003 Rose Revolution, a non-violent uprising that brought a new, Western-educated government to power led by Mikheil Saakashvili. The new administration's primary goal was to restore state authority, and it launched a radical anti-crime and anti-corruption campaign, famously known as the "zero-tolerance" policy. This approach involved drastic measures, including the complete overhaul of the police force, which saw the dismissal of approximately 16,000 officers and the creation of a new, largely trusted Patrol Police. To dismantle the powerful criminal elite, the government passed a strict anti-mafia law in 2005, modeled on the American RICO Act, which criminalized membership in the "thieves' world" and being a "thief-in-law."The policy had immediate and dramatic consequences. The number of recorded crimes surged, peaking at 62,283 in 2006. This was attributed not only to a potential rise in crime but also to a 2005 change in the Criminal Procedure Code that mandated the registration of all criminal reports, ending the Soviet-era practice of concealing offenses. The most significant outcome was a massive surge in Georgia's prison population. The number of inmates quadrupled in under a decade, from 6,119 in 2003 to a peak of 24,114 in 2011, giving Georgia one of the highest incarceration rates in Europe.
While the policy was credited with significantly reducing petty corruption and dismantling the overt power of organized crime groups—with some of their confiscated properties being turned into police stations—it drew heavy criticism from human rights organizations for its repressive methods. Critics pointed to the excessive use of force, a disregard for due process, and the widespread use of plea bargains, which were often seen as a tool for generating state revenue rather than ensuring justice. In 2008-2009 alone, fines imposed in drug-related cases through plea bargains reached 45 million GEL. The judiciary's independence was also compromised, with an extremely low percentage of acquittals prompting defendants to accept plea deals.
Post-2012 liberalization
The 2012 parliamentary election resulted in a peaceful transfer of power to the Georgian Dream coalition, which initiated a significant shift in criminal justice policy, moving away from the "zero-tolerance" approach of the previous government. One of the new government's first and most impactful acts was a large-scale amnesty law passed in January 2013. This led to the release of thousands of prisoners, causing the prison population to plummet from 19,349 at the end of 2012 to 9,093 by the end of 2013—a reduction of over 50% in a single year. This shift was accompanied by other liberalizing measures, such as changing the rules for cumulating sentences and a significant decrease in the use of imprisonment as a penalty.After an initial dip, the number of total recorded crimes began to rise again, reaching a new peak of 64,123 in 2019 before declining during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Despite the formal liberalization, systemic challenges remained. Drug policy, in particular, was a point of contention. While the rate of imprisonment for drug-related offenses decreased, the legislation against users was described as "unreasonably strict," and the number of convictions for drug crimes remained high, peaking in 2013–2014. The practice of imposing massive fines also diminished; whereas fines for drug offenses reached 45 million GEL in 2008-2009, this figure decreased significantly after 2012. A landmark development occurred in 2018, when the Constitutional Court of Georgia ruled that criminal punishment for the personal consumption of cannabis was unconstitutional, though its sale and cultivation remained illegal.
Persistent structural issues, such as a lack of judicial independence, continued to draw criticism from both domestic and international observers. NGOs and the U.S. Department of State highlighted the influence of an informal, well-connected group of judges, pejoratively referred to as "the clan," which allegedly stifled judicial independence and obstructed reforms. Similarly, insufficient rehabilitation programs for former inmates and the politicization of law enforcement indicated that while the methods of the state had changed, a fundamental reform of the justice system remained incomplete.