Third Battle of Panipat
The Third Battle of Panipat took place on 14 January 1761 between the Maratha Empire and the invading army of the Durrani Empire. The battle took place in and around the city of Panipat, approximately north of Delhi. The Afghans were supported by three key allies in India: Najib-ud-Daula who persuaded the support of the Rohilla chiefs, elements of the declining Mughal Empire, and most prized the Oudh State under Shuja-ud-Daula. The Maratha army was led by Sadashivrao Bhau, who was third-highest authority of the Maratha Confederacy after the Chhatrapati and the Peshwa. The bulk of the Maratha army was stationed in the Deccan Plateau with the Peshwa.
Militarily, the battle pitted the artillery, musketry, and cavalry of the Marathas against the heavy cavalry, musketry and mounted artillery of the Afghans and the Rohillas led by Ahmad Shah Durrani and Najib ud-Daula. The battle is considered to have been the largest and one of the most eventful fought in the 18th century, and it had perhaps the largest number of fatalities in a single day reported in a classic formation battle between two armies.
The battle lasted for several days and involved over 125,000 troops; protracted skirmishes occurred, with losses and gains on both sides. The Afghan army ultimately emerged victorious from the battle after successfully destroying several Maratha flanks. The extent of the losses on both sides is heavily disputed by historians, but it is believed that between 60,000 and 70,000 troops were killed in the fighting, while the numbers of injured and prisoners taken vary considerably. According to the single-best eyewitness chronicle—the bakhar by Shuja-ud-Daula's Diwan Kashi Raja—about 40,000 Maratha prisoners were collectively massacred on the day after the battle. British historian Grant Duff includes an interview of a survivor of these massacres in his History of the Marathas and generally corroborates this number. Shejwalkar, whose monograph Panipat 1761 is often regarded as the single-best secondary source on the battle, says that "not less than 100,000 Marathas perished during and after the battle".
Background
In 1757, Ahmad Shah Durrani appointed his son, Timur Shah, as the governor of Punjab. Since Timur Shah was a minor, the Durrani commander-in-chief, Jahan Khan, assumed control of the administration. Jahan Khan's rule was harsh—he forced Adina Beg Khan, the governor of Jalandhar Doab, to retreat to the hills and persecuted Sodhi Wadbhag Singh of Kartarpur. Determined to retaliate, Adina Beg Khan allied with Jassa Singh Ahluwalia by paying a large tribute and permitting the Sikhs to plunder the Jalandhar Doab and defeated the Afghans at Battle of Mahilpur. By March 1758, Adina Beg Khan became uneasy with the growing influence of the Sikhs. He sought help from the Marathas, who had gained control of Delhi after defeating the Mughals in the Battle of Delhi. Adina Beg offered the Marathas a large daily payment to assist him in capturing Lahore. Additionally, he persuaded the Sikhs to join forces with the Marathas against the Afghans. Adina Beg also gained the support of Raghunathrao and together they drove the Afghans out of Lahore. The Maratha and Sikh forces then pursued the retreating Afghans on horseback, eventually capturing Attock. The Punjab now came under Maratha rule, with Adina appointed subahdar of the Punjab in 1758 in return for a yearly tribute of seventy five lakh of rupees. Raghunathrao and Malhar Rao Holkar, the two commanders-in-chief of the Maratha forces, remained in Lahore for three months after which they retired to the Deccan leaving Adina in sole control.This brought the Marathas into direct confrontation with the Durrani Empire of Ahmad Shāh Abdali. In 1759, he raised an army the core of which was from the Qizilbash, and recruited other troops such as the Pashtun tribes, Kurds, and Uzbeks. and made several gains against the smaller Maratha garrisons in Punjab. He then joined his Indian allies—the Rohillas of the Gangetic Doab, the Muslims of Northern India, and Shuja-ud-Daula—forming a broad coalition against the Marathas.
To counter this, Raghunathrao was supposed to go north to handle the situation. Raghunathrao asked for large number of soldiers, which was denied by Sadashivrao Bhau, his cousin and Diwan of Peshwa. Therefore, he declined to go. Sadashivrao Bhau was instead made commander in chief of the Maratha Army, under whom the Battle of Panipat was fought.
The Marathas, under the command of Sadashivrao Bhau, responded by gathering an army of between 45,000 and 60,000, which was accompanied by roughly 200,000 non-combatants, a number of whom were pilgrims desirous of making pilgrimages to Hindu holy sites in northern India. The Marathas started their northward journey from Patdur on 14 March 1760. Both sides tried to get the Nawab of Awadh, Shuja-ud-Daulah, into their camp. By late July Shuja-ud-Daulah made the decision to join the Afghan-Rohilla coalition, preferring to join what was perceived as the "army of Islam".
Rise of the Marathas
Grant Duff, describing the Maratha army:The Marathas had gained control of a considerable part of India in the intervening period. In 1758 they nominally occupied Delhi, captured Lahore and drove out Timur Shah Durrani, the son and viceroy of the Afghan ruler, Ahmad Shah Abdali. This was the high-water mark of Maratha expansion, where the boundaries of their empire extended north of the Sindhu river all the way down south to northern Kerala. This territory was ruled through the Peshwa, who talked of placing his son Vishwasrao on the Mughal throne. However, Delhi still remained under the control of Mughals, key Muslim intellectuals including Shah Waliullah and other Muslim clergies in India were frightened at these developments. In desperation they appealed to Ahmad Shah Abdali, the ruler of Afghanistan, to halt the threat. The Marathas attempted to turn over the support of the Gujarati Muslim Babis, the Indian Rohillas, Nizam brothers of the Deccan, and Shuja-ud-Dawlah.
Prelude
, angered by the news from his son and his allies, was unwilling to allow the Marathas' spread go unchecked. By the end of 1759 Abdali with his Qizilbash and the Afghan tribes, had reached Lahore as well as Delhi and defeated the smaller enemy garrisons, and was joined by the Muslims of Northern India, the Rohillas, and Shuja-ud-Daula. Ahmed Shah, at this point, withdrew his army to Anupshahr, on the frontier of the Rohilla country, where he successfully convinced the Nawab of Oudh Shuja-ud-Daula to join his alliance against the Marathas. The Marathas had earlier helped Safdarjung in defeating Rohillas in Farrukhabad. Several high ranking nobles of the Mughal Empire were able to persuade Maharaja Deep Chand of the Kingdom of Kumaon, an old Himalayan ally of the Mughal Empire, to support the Afghan side in the battle.The Marathas under Sadashivrao Bhau responded to the news of the Afghans' return to North India by raising an army, and they marched North. Bhau's force was bolstered by some Maratha forces under Holkar, Scindia, Gaikwad and Govind Pant Bundele. Suraj Mal also had joined Bhausaheb initially. This combined army captured the Mughal capital, Delhi, from an Afghan garrison in December 1759. Delhi had been reduced to ashes many times due to previous invasions, and in addition there being acute shortage of supplies in the Maratha camp. Bhau ordered the sacking of the already depopulated city. He is said to have planned to place his nephew and the Peshwa's son, Vishwasrao, on the Delhi throne. The Jats withdrew their support from the Marathas. Their withdrawal from the ensuing battle was to play a crucial role in its result. The first blood was drawn when the leader of the Rohillas, an Indian Muslim named Qutb Khan, attacked a small Maratha army led by Dattaji Shinde at Burari Ghat. Dattaji camped at the Buradi Fort, south of Panipat, deciding to only engage with Abdali with the aid of Malharao Holkar. He was beheaded and killed in an attack by Qutb Khan.
Suraj Mal's advice to Sadashiv Rao Bhau
Before Battle of Panipat a war council was formed by Maratha commander-in-chief Sadashiv Rao Bhau in which Maharaja Suraj Mal was invited to give advice for war strategy against Abdali.Jat chief Surajmal provided following advice :
- Women, children, old people, families of soldier and non combatants should either be left on the other side of Chambal in Maratha's stronghold of Jhansi and Gwalior or in protection of Suraj Mal’s one of 4 forts in Jat strongholds.
- Large baggage and heavy artillery should not be taken as they will slow down Maratha movement in the battlefield against Durrani’s forces.
- If Marathas find themselves on losing ground then a quick moving force will be able to move backwards in friendly country easily and Abdali will not be keen on crossing Chambal.
- Road for supply lines should be kept open so that Maratha army will not face problems in getting supplies during war
- One division of the Maratha army should be sent to Lahore and other to the east to destroy the supply lines so that Abdali will not be able to secure supplies from his allies for his army.
- A light cavalry guerrilla warfare will be suggested instead of conventional face-to-face warfare as Durrani will not be able to sustain a long warfare and when Monsoon will come both sides will find forces moving much slower, Durrani will be in much more disadvantage without supplies compared to Marathas and this will force Abdali to move back to his country.