Ba'athist Iraq
Ba'athist Iraq, officially the Iraqi Republic and later the Republic of Iraq, was the Iraqi state between 1968 and 2003 under the one-party rule of the Iraqi regional branch of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party. The regime emerged as a result of the 17 July Revolution which brought the Ba'athists to power, and lasted until the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.
The Ba'ath Party, led by Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, came to power in Iraq through the bloodless 17 July 1968 Revolution, which overthrew president Abdul Rahman Arif and prime minister Tahir Yahya. By the mid-1970s, Saddam Hussein became the country's de facto leader, despite al-Bakr's de jure presidency. Saddam's new policies boosted the Iraqi economy, improved living standards, and elevated Iraq's standing within the Arab world. However, several internal factors were imminently threatening Iraq's stability; the Sunni-dominated Ba'athist government faced Shia religious separatism and Kurdish ethnic separatism. The Second Iraqi–Kurdish War was of great concern to the government as Kurdish rebels received extensive support from Iran, Israel, and the United States. Following the 1974–1975 Shatt al-Arab clashes, Saddam met with Iranian monarch Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and signed the 1975 Algiers Agreement, ceding territory to Iran in exchange for an end to Kurdish support. With the Kurdish rebellion subsequently disadvantaged, the Iraqi military reasserted the federal government's control over Iraqi Kurdistan.
In 1979, Saddam succeeded the ailing al-Bakr as president and publicly purged the Ba'ath Party of his opponents. Alarmed by Iranian attempts to export the revolution in Iraq, Saddam adopted an aggressive stance against Iran and its new theocratic leader, Ruhollah Khomeini, after his rejections of Iraqi goodwill offers. In September 1980, Iraq invaded Iran, triggering the eight-year-long Iran–Iraq War that ended in a stalemate in 1988. The conflict left Iraq economically devastated and dependent on foreign loans. Kuwait, which had loaned money to Iraq, demanded repayment and increased oil production, lowering international oil prices and worsening the Iraqi economy, while pressuring the Iraqi leadership to repay the loans. In 1989, Iraq accused Kuwait of stealing Iraqi petroleum, and failed negotiations resulted in the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, triggering the Gulf War. Iraq occupied Kuwait until February 1991, when a 42-country UNSC military coalition expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Subsequent international sanctions cut Iraq off from all global markets and crippled the Iraqi economy throughout the 1990s, though it began recovering by the early 2000s as sanctions enforcement waned. The sanctions were widely criticized for its negative impact on quality of life in Iraq, prompting the establishment of the Oil-for-Food Programme.
Following the September 11 attacks, the United States' Bush administration began building a case for invading Iraq and overthrowing Saddam's regime, falsely claiming that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and had links with al-Qaeda. On 20 March 2003, Iraq was invaded by a U.S.-led coalition, which overthrew Saddam and captured much of Iraq by May. In December 2003, American troops captured Saddam and turned him over to Iraq's new Shia-led government. From 2005 to 2006, Saddam was put on trial for crimes against humanity concerning the 1982 Dujail massacre, in which the Iraqi government killed Shi'ite rebels. After sentencing Saddam to death, the Iraqi Special Tribunal executed him for crimes against humanity on 30 December 2006. The period of Saddam's rule has been described as Iraq's longest period of internal stability since independence in 1932 but his rule has also been criticized for its extensive repression, particularly towards the Kurdish population.
History
1968 coup
In contrast to previous coups d'état in Iraq's history, the 1968 coup, referred to as the 17 July Revolution, was, according to Con Coughlin, "a relatively civil affair". The coup started in the early hours of 17 July, when a number of military units and civilian Ba'athists seized several key government and military buildings; these included the Ministry of Defence, the electricity station, radio stations, all the city's bridges and "a number of military bases". All telephone lines were cut at 03:00, by which time several tanks had been commanded to halt in front of the Presidential Palace. Abdul Rahman Arif, the then-President of Iraq, first knew of the coup when jubilant members of the Republican Guard started shooting into the air in "a premature triumph". Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, the leader of the operation, told Arif about his situation through military communication hardware at the base of operations. Arif asked for more time, during which he contacted other military units to seek support. As he soon found out, the odds were against him, and he surrendered. Arif telephoned al-Bakr and told him that he was willing to resign; to show his gratitude, al-Bakr guaranteed his safety. al-Bakr's deputies, Hardan al-Tikriti and Salah Omar al-Ali, were ordered to give Arif this message in person. Arif and his wife and son were quickly sent on the first available flight to London. Later that morning, a Ba'athist broadcast announced that a new government had been established. The coup was carried out with such ease that there were no deaths.The coup succeeded because of contributions made by the military; the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party was not strong enough to take power by itself. The Ba'ath Party managed to make a deal with Abd ar-Razzaq an-Naif, the deputy head of military intelligence, and Ibrahim Daud, the head of the Republican Guard. Both Naif and Daud knew that the long-term survival of Arif's and Tahir Yahya's government looked bleak, but also knew that the Ba'athists needed them if the coup was to be successful. For his participation in the coup, Naif demanded to be given the post of Prime Minister after the coup as a reward, and a symbol for his strength. Daud was also "rewarded" with a post; he became Minister of Defence. However, not everything was going according to Naif's and Daud's plan; al-Bakr had told the Ba'ath leadership in a secret meeting that the two would be liquidated either "during, or after, the revolution".
al-Bakr, as the leader of the coup's military operation, retained his position as Regional Secretary of the Ba'ath Party, and was elected to the posts of Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, President and Prime Minister. In the immediate aftermath of the coup, a power struggle developed between al-Bakr and Naif. In all practicality, Naif should have had the upper hand; he was a respected officer and was supported by the common soldiers. al-Bakr, however, proved to be more cunning, persuasive and organised than Naif, Daud and their supporters. One of al-Bakr's first decisions in office was to appoint over 100 new officers to the Republican Guard. Saddam Hussein worked, in the meantime, to establish the party's security and intelligence organisation to combat its enemies. On 29 July, Daud left for a tour to Jordan to inspect the Iraqi troops located there following the Six-Day War with Israel. The following day, Naif was invited to eat lunch at the Presidential Palace with al-Bakr, during which Saddam burst into the room with three accomplices and threatened Naif with death. Naif responded by crying out; "I have four children". Saddam ordered Naif to leave Iraq immediately if he wanted to live. Naif complied, was exiled to Morocco. An assassination attempt in 1973 was unsuccessful, but he was assassinated in London on the orders of Saddam in 1978. Daud shared a similar fate, and was exiled to Saudi Arabia. The Ba'athists were by no means ensured of victory; if any of Naif's supporters had known of the operation against him, Baghdad could have become the centre, in the words of journalist Con Coughlin, "of an ugly bloodbath".
Al-Bakr's rule and Saddam's rise to power (1968–1979)
al-Bakr strengthened his position in the party with the help of Saddam's newly established party security apparatus and the intelligence services. Most of 1968 was used to repress non-Ba'athist thought and groups; for instance, a campaign against Nasserists and communists was initiated under Saddam's command. Several spy plots were created by the government; spies who were "caught" were accused of being a part of a Zionist plot against the state. The Iraqi Communist Party was skeptical of the new Ba'athist government, as many of its members remembered the anti-communist campaign launched against them by the Ba'athist government of 1963. After taking power, al-Bakr offered the ICP cabinet positions in the new government; the ICP rejected this offer. al-Bakr responded by initiating a systematic campaign against the ICP and communist sympathisers. However, as historian Charles Tripp notes in A History of Iraq, the campaign started "a curious game" whereby the government alternately persecuted and courted the party until 1972–1973, when the ICP was offered, and accepted, membership in the National Progressive Front. The reason for this "curious game" was the Ba'ath Party's belief that the ICP was more dangerous than it really was. When Aziz al-Haji broke away from the ICP, established the Iraqi Communist Party and initiated a "popular revolutionary war" against the government, it was duly crushed. By April 1969 the "popular revolutionary" uprising had been crushed, and al-Haji recanted his beliefs publicly. Another reason for this anti-communist policy was that many Ba'ath Party members openly sympathised with communists or other socialist forces. However, at this stage, neither al-Bakr nor Saddam had enough support within the party to initiate a policy unpopular within it; at the Seventh Regional Congress of the Ba'ath Party, both al-Bakr and other leading Ba'athists expressed their support for "radical socialism".During the 1970s, military officers unsuccessfully attempted to overthrow the Baathist regime on at least two occasions. In January 1970, an attempted coup led by two retired officers, Major General Abd al Ghani ar Rawi and Colonel Salih Mahdi as Samarrai, was thwarted as the conspirators entered the Republican Palace. In June 1973, a plot by Nazim Kazzar, a Shia and the director of internal security, to assassinate al Bakr and Saddam Husayn was also thwarted. Both coup attempts were followed by summary trials, executions, and purges of the military.
By the mid-to-late 1970s, Saddam's power within the Ba'ath Party and the government grew; he became de facto leader of the country, although al-Bakr remained as president, Ba'ath Party leader and Revolutionary Command Council chairman. In 1977, following a wave of protests by Shias against the government, al-Bakr relinquished his control over the Ministry of Defence; Adnan Khairallah Tulfah, Saddam's brother-in-law, was appointed defence minister. This appointment underscored the clannish character of the Ba'ath Party and the government. In contrast to Saddam's fortunes, those of al-Bakr's were on the wane. Rumours of al-Bakr's bad health began to circulate in the country. By the end of 1977, al-Bakr had little control over the country through his office as president. The reason Saddam did not become president until 1979 may be explained by Saddam's own insecurity. Before making himself de jure head of state, Saddam initiated an anti-communist campaign; the ICP had no real power, and most of its leading officials had left the country or been imprisoned or executed by the Ba'ath government. The campaign was not centered on the ICP, but also Ba'athists who did not support Saddam. Saddam had initiated a similar campaign in 1978, that time to check where the loyalties of certain left-wingers were: Ba'athism or socialism. Following the campaign, Saddam entered the Arab-world stage for the first time under the banner of Nasserism and Gamal Abdel Nasser by criticising the Camp David Accords between Anwar Sadat of Egypt and the state of Israel.
It was in this situation that Saddam took over the offices of president, Ba'ath Party leader and Revolutionary Command Council chairman. Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri was promoted to the office of vice-chairman. There were also rumours within the top echelons of power that al-Bakr was planning to designate Hafez al-Assad as his successor. Immediately after Saddam seized power, over 60 members of the Ba'ath Party and the government leadership were charged with fomenting an anti-Iraqi Ba'athist plot in collaboration with al-Assad and the Damascus-based Ba'ath Party.